United States v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway Co.

Memorandum opinion by Me. Justice McReynolds. During 1910 and 1911 the appellee railway company entered into customary arrangements with the Post Office Department to cany mail over a number of routes for quadrennial terms ending June 30, 1914, and 1915, com *453 pensation to be based upon ascertained weights. While these were in force, by Act of August 24, 1912, c. 389, 37 Stat. 557, Congress directed establishment of the parcel post service without providing for any additional compensation oh account of the large increase in weights which would surely follow. The Postmaster General called attention to the matter January 20, 1913; and after much consideration the» following clause was incorporated in the Act of March 4, 1913, c. 143, 37 Stat. 791, 797: “That on account of the increased weight of mails resulting from the enactment of section eight of the Act of August twenty-fourth, nineteen hundred and twelve, . . '. the Postmaster General is authorized to add to the compensation paid for transportation on railroad routes on and after July first, nineteen hundred and thirteen, for the remainder of the contract terms, not exceeding five per centum thereof per annum, excepting upon routes weighed since January first, nineteen hundred and thirteen, and to be readjusted from July first, nineteen hundred and thirteen, until otherwise provided by law.” Acting under this provision, the Postmaster General refused to allow increased compensation of five per centum upon all routes, but apportioned payments among them — ■ never in excess of five per centum; — according to a carefully worked out formula which he deemed appropriate. Appellee sued for the difference between amount actually received and what it would have received if five per centum had been added. Considering history of the legislation and intent of Congress supposed to be indicated thereby the Court of Claims held that the act “required the Postmaster General to add 5 per cent, to the compensation being paid on all of said routes, and he having failed to do so that the plaintiff is entitled to recover the difference sued for.” 52 Ct. Clms. 338, 361. *454 We are unable to agree with this conclusion. ' The language of the enactment is clear and we think it vested in the Postmaster General a discretion which, so far as shown by the record, has not been abused. We are not unmindful of the burden imposed upon appellee nor of the circumstances which lend color to a.different conclusion; but these are not sufficient to justify a disregard of the plain import of the words which Congress deliberately adopted. The judgment below must be reversed and the cause remanded with direction to dismiss the petition. Reversed and remanded.