El-Amin v. Berryhill

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA MELVIN ABDULLAH EL-AMIN, : CIVIL NO. 4:21-CV-2060 : Plaintiff, : : v. : : (Magistrate Judge Carlson) KILOLO KIJAKAZI, ACTING : COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL : SECURITY, : : Defendant : MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER I. Introduction and Background This is a Social Security appeal brought by a state inmate. The plaintiff filed a motion for entry of default judgment. (Doc. 19.) This motion was based upon an apparent misunderstanding on the plaintiff’s part. The plaintiff sought entry of a default judgment because he believed that the defendant was served and failed to respond. In fact the defendant had responded by moving to dismiss this complaint. (Doc. 17). That motion remains pending before the court. Recognizing that default judgments are governed by Rule 55 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and a default judgment may only be entered when a properly served party against whom the default judgment is sought “has failed to plead or otherwise respond,” Rule 55(a), F.R.Civ.P., we found that the plaintiff was not entitled to the entry of a default judgment against this defendant because the defendant had responded by moving to dismiss the complaint. Accordingly, we denied the motion for default judgment. (Doc. 20). However, dissatisfied with this outcome, El-Amin has filed a motion to reconsider, (Doc. 23), along with a motion seeking our recusal. (Doc. 21). Mindful that “a judge ‘has as strong a duty to sit when there is no legitimate reason to recuse as he does to recuse when the law and facts require[,]’” Conklin v. Warrington Township, 476 F.Supp.2d 458, 463 (M.D. Pa. 2007), for the reasons set forth below we find that the grounds for recusal posited by the plaintiff do not justify recusal. Therefore, the request for recusal must be denied. II. Discussion The legal standards which govern such recusal requests were aptly summarized in Conklin v. Warrington Township, 476 F. Supp. 2d 458 (M.D. Pa. 2007). In terms that are equally applicable here, the court explained that: The disqualification standard is set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 455 , which provides in pertinent part as follows: (a) Any justice, judge, or magistrate judge of the United States shall disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned. (b) He shall also disqualify himself in the following circumstances: (1) Where he has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party.... Id. Pursuant to the above quoted language, the court must consider whether its rulings and statements objectively produce the appearance of bias against [the plaintiff]. As explained by the Supreme Court, these provisions “require ... ‘bias and prejudice’ ... to be evaluated on an objective basis, so that what matters is not the reality of bias or prejudice but its appearance.” Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 548 , 114 S.Ct. 1147 , 127 L.Ed.2d 474 (1994). This objective standard requires recusal when a “reasonable man knowing all the circumstances would harbor doubts concerning the judge's impartiality.” Edelstein v. Wilentz, 812 F.2d 128, 131 (3d Cir.1987) (citing United States v. Dalfonso, 707 F.2d 757, 760 (3d Cir.1983)); see also In re Antar, 71 F.3d 97, 101 (3d Cir.1995). If the record presents a close question, the court must resolve the issue in favor of disqualification. Nichols v. Alley, 71 F.3d 347, 352 (10th Cir.1995). Id. at 462-63 . It is clear, however, that a party’s disappointment with what the party anticipates may be the court’s rulings cannot form the basis for recusal. As we have observed: The Third Circuit has repeatedly observed that “a party's displeasure with legal rulings does not form an adequate basis for recusal.” Securacomm Consulting, Inc. v. Securacom, Inc., 224 F.3d 273, 278 (3d Cir.2000) (citing In re TMI Litig., 193 F.3d 613, 728 (3d Cir.1999) and Jones v. Pittsburgh Nat'l Corp., 899 F.2d 1350 , 1356 (3d Cir.1990)). Subsections 455(a) and (b)(1) require the source of bias to be extrajudicial, that is stemming from a source outside of the proceeding, or of such an intensity as to make a fair trial impossible. Blanche Rd. Corp. v. Bensalem Twp., 57 F.3d 253 (3d Cir.1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 915 , 116 S.Ct. 303 , 133 L.Ed.2d 208 (1995). As stated by the Supreme Court: [O]pinions formed by the judge on the basis of facts introduced or events occurring in the course of the current proceedings, or of prior proceedings, do not constitute a basis for a bias or partiality motion unless they display a deep-seated favoritism or antagonism that would make fair judgment impossible. Thus, judicial remarks during the course of a trial that are critical or disapproving of, or even hostile to, counsel, the parties, or their cases, ordinarily do not support a bias or partiality challenge. They may do so if they reveal an opinion that derives from an extrajudicial source; and they will do so if they reveal such a high degree of favoritism or antagonism as to make fair judgment impossible. Liteky, 510 U.S. at 555 , 114 S.Ct. 1147 (emphasis in original). Id. at 463. Furthermore, in assessing recusal requests, courts must remain mindful that, in the hands of some litigants, a recusal motion may simply be a calculated tactical tool designed to avoid the result which the law dictates in a case, or attempt to unilaterally choose a new judge. Thus, in every instance: [T]he court must consider whether attacks on a judge's impartiality are simply subterfuge to circumvent anticipated adverse rulings. In re Antar, 71 F.3d at 101 ; Alexander v. Primerica Holdings, Inc., 10 F.3d 155, 162 (3d Cir.1993). Indeed, a judge “has as strong a duty to sit when there is no legitimate reason to recuse as he does to recuse when the law and facts require.” Bryce v. Episcopal Church in the Diocese of Colorado, 289 F.3d 648, 659 (10th Cir.2002) (quoting Nichols, 71 F.3d at 351 ); Cooney v. Booth, 262 F.Supp.2d 494, 508 (E.D.Pa.2003); see also United States v. Snyder, 235 F.3d 42 , 46 n. 1 (1st Cir.2000); Curley v. St. John's University, 7 F.Supp.2d 359, 362 (S.D.N.Y.1998). Id. at 463 . Judged against these legal standards, we must decline this request that we recuse ourselves from this case since the plaintiff’s request for our recusal rests upon our prior rulings in this case. Since the Third Circuit has repeatedly observed that “a party's displeasure with legal rulings does not form an adequate basis for recusal,” Securacomm Consulting, Inc. v. Securacom, Inc., 224 F.3d 273, 278 (3d Cir.2000), El-Amin’s disappointment with our decisions simply cannot be converted into grounds compelling our recusal. Accordingly, we conclude our legal analysis of this recusal motion as we began that analysis by reminding the plaintiff that “a judge ‘has as strong a duty to sit when there is no legitimate reason to recuse as he does to recuse when the law and facts require’” Conklin, 476 F.Supp.2d at 463 . Guided by this basic truth, this recusal motion will be denied. An appropriate order follows. III. Order For the foregoing reasons, the plaintiff’s motion (Doc. 21), which seeks our recusal is DENIED. So ordered this 19th day of April 2022. S/Martin C. Carlson Martin C. Carlson United States Magistrate Judge