Marshall v. Fox

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA Mimi Joe Marshall, ) C/A No.: 1:19-2088-RMG-SVH ) Plaintiff, ) ) vs. ) ) ORDER AND NOTICE Mental Health Dept. of Correction, ) Ms. Fox, and Dept. of Correction ) Inst., ) ) Defendants. ) ) Mimi Joe Marshall (“Plaintiff”), proceeding pro se, filed this complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against “Mental Health Dept. of Correction,” Ms. Fox, and “Dept. of Correction Inst.” (collectively, “Defendants”), alleging violations of his constitutional rights. Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B) and Local Civ. Rule 73.02(B)(2)(e) (D.S.C.), the undersigned is authorized to review such complaints for relief and submit findings and recommendations to the district judge. I. Factual and Procedural Background Plaintiff is incarcerated at Lee Correctional Institution. [ECF No. 1 at 2]. He alleges on April 15, 2018, from 5:00 to 6:00, prison officials left him in the F3 dorm, where bodies were lying on the ground. at 4–5. Plaintiff asserts he has been denied needed mental health care after the incident and that the Department of Corrections’ lack of security endangered his life. II. Discussion A. Standard of Review Plaintiff filed his complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915 , which permits an indigent litigant to commence an action in federal court without prepaying the administrative costs of proceeding with the lawsuit. To protect against possible abuses of this privilege, the statute allows a district court to dismiss a case upon a finding that the action fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted or is frivolous or malicious. 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (e)(2)(B)(i), (ii). A finding of frivolity can be made where the complaint lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact. , 504 U.S. 25, 31 (1992). A claim based on a meritless legal theory may be dismissed sua sponte under 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (e)(2)(B). , 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989). Pro se complaints are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys. , 574 F.2d 1147, 1151 (4th Cir. 1978). A federal court is charged with liberally construing a complaint filed by a pro se litigant to allow the development of a potentially meritorious case. , 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). In evaluating a pro se complaint, the plaintiff’s allegations are assumed to be true. ., 529 F.2d 70, 74 (2d Cir. 1975). The mandated liberal construction afforded to pro se pleadings means that if the court can reasonably read the pleadings to state a valid claim on which the plaintiff could prevail, it should do so. Nevertheless, the requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the court can ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts that set forth a claim currently cognizable in a federal district court. ., 901 F.2d 387 , 390–91 (4th Cir. 1990). B. Analysis A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Although the court must liberally construe a pro se complaint, the United States Supreme Court has made it clear a plaintiff must do more than make conclusory statements to state a claim. , 556 U.S. 662 , 677‒78 (2009); , 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). Rather, the complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim that is plausible on its face, and the reviewing court need only accept as true the complaint’s factual allegations, not its legal conclusions. , 556 U.S. at 678‒79. To state a plausible claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 , an aggrieved party must sufficiently allege he was injured by “the deprivation of any [of his or her] rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the [United States] Constitution and laws” by a “person” acting “under color of state law.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ; 5 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, § 1230 (3d ed. 2014). Only “persons” may act under color of state law, and, therefore, a defendant in a § 1983 action must qualify as a “person.” , 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978). Inanimate objects such as buildings, facilities, and grounds cannot act under color of state law. , 27 F. App’x 173, 178 (4th Cir. 2001) (finding that the medical department of a prison is not a person pursuant to § 1983); , 750 F. Supp. 1131 (S.D. Fla. 1990) (dismissing city police department as improper defendant in § 1983 action because not “person” under the statute); , 578 F. Supp. 1368, 1370 (N.D. Ga. 1984) (dismissing police department as party defendant because it was merely a vehicle through which city government fulfills policing functions). The doctrine of supervisory liability is generally inapplicable to § 1983 suits, such that an employer or supervisor is not liable for the acts of his employees, absent an official policy or custom that results in illegal action. , 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978); , 690 F.2d 1133 , 1142–43 (4th Cir. 1982). The Supreme Court explains that “[b]ecause vicarious liability is inapplicable to and § 1983 suits, a plaintiff must plead that each Government-official defendant, through the official’s own individual actions, has violated the Constitution.” , 556 U.S. at 676 ; , 737 F.2d 368 , 372–74 (4th Cir. 1984) (finding officials may be held liable for the acts of their subordinates, if the official is aware of a pervasive, unreasonable risk of harm from a specified source and fails to take corrective action as a result of deliberate indifference or tacit authorization). To assert a viable § 1983 claim against a particular public official, Plaintiff must allege a causal connection or affirmative link between the conduct of which he complains and the official sued. , 556 U.S. 662, 676 (2009) (providing that a plaintiff in a § 1983 action must plead that the defendant, through his own individual actions, violated the Constitution); , 423 U.S. 362, 371-72 (1976) (holding a § 1983 plaintiff must show that he suffered a specific injury as a result of specific conduct of a defendant, and an affirmative link between the injury and that conduct); , 766 F.2d 841, 850 (4th Cir. 1985) (“In order for an individual to be liable under § 1983, it must be ‘affirmatively shown that the official charged acted personally in the deprivation of the plaintiff’s rights. The doctrine of respondeat superior has no application under this section.’”) (quoting , 550 F.2d 926, 928 (4th Cir. 1977)); , 550 F.2d at 928 (finding for an individual to be liable under § 1983, it must be affirmatively shown that the official charged acted personally in the deprivation of the plaintiff’s rights). In addition, Plaintiff must show Defendants acted with deliberate indifference. , 979 F.2d 987 , 991 (4th Cir. 1992). To show deliberate indifference, an inmate must establish two requirements: (1) objectively, the deprivation suffered or injury inflicted was “sufficiently serious,” and (2) subjectively, the prison officials acted with a “sufficiently culpable state of mind.” , 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994); , 77 F.3d 756 , 761 (4th Cir. 1996). Objectively, the court must assess “whether society considers the risk that the prisoner complains of to be so grave that it violates contemporary standards of decency to expose unwillingly to such a risk. In other words, the prisoner must show that the risk of which he complains is not one that today’s society chooses to tolerate.” , 509 U.S. 25, 36 (1993) (emphasis in original). To challenge prison conditions, Plaintiff must show “evidence of a serious or significant physical or emotional injury resulting from the challenged conditions.” , 989 F.2d 1375, 1381 (4th Cir. 1993) (“The Eighth Amendment does not prohibit cruel and unusual prison conditions; it prohibits cruel and unusual punishments. If a prisoner has not suffered serious or significant physical or mental injury as a result of the challenged condition, he simply has not been subjected to cruel and unusual punishment within the meaning of the Amendment.”). Plaintiff does not provide sufficient facts for the court to evaluate his claim. To the extent Plaintiff alleges deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs or failure to protect, he fails to allege unconstitutional conduct by a particular public official subject to suit under § 1983. In addition, Plaintiff fails to specifically allege an injury or state his requested relief. Accordingly, Plaintiff's complaint is subject to summary dismissal. NOTICE CONCERNING AMENDMENT Plaintiff may attempt to correct the defects in his complaint by filing an amended complaint by August 20, 2019, along with any appropriate service documents. Plaintiff is reminded an amended complaint replaces the original complaint and should be complete in itself. See Young v. City of Mount Ranier, 238 F.3d 567, 572 (4th Cir. 2001) (“As a general rule, an amended pleading ordinarily supersedes the original and renders it of no legal effect.”) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). If Plaintiff files an amended complaint, the undersigned will conduct screening of the amended complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. If Plaintiff fails to file an amended complaint or fails to cure the deficiencies identified above, the undersigned will recommend to the district court that the claims be dismissed without leave for further amendment. IT IS SO ORDERED. (Ye. V. adper July 31, 2019 Shiva V. Hodges Columbia, South Carolina United States Magistrate Judge