in the Matter of the Marriage of Ruth Ann Thompson and Roy Glenn Thompson

NO. 07-08-0188-CV IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS AT AMARILLO PANEL C AUGUST 7, 2008 ______________________________ IN THE MATTER OF THE MARRIAGE OF RUTH ANN THOMPSON AND ROY GLENN THOMPSON _________________________________ FROM THE 242ND DISTRICT COURT OF SWISHER COUNTY; NO. B10861-0604; HONORABLE ED SELF, JUDGE _______________________________ Before QUINN, C.J., and HANCOCK and PIRTLE, JJ. MEMORANDUM OPINION Pending before this Court is a joint motion for dismissal of the appeal of the parties’ final decree of divorce. By the motion, the parties represent they have entered into a settlement agreement, and the motion is signed by both parties’ counsel. The motion is accompanied by a copy of the parties’ Rule 11 agreement. The parties request that mandate issue immediately in order to effectuate their settlement agreement. Without passing on the merits of the appeal, we grant the motion and dismiss the appeal. Tex. R. App. P. 42.1(a). No motion for rehearing will be entertained and our mandate will issue forthwith. Patrick A. Pirtle Justice ce that was the subject of that motion without the necessity of making further objection. Gearing v. State, 685 S.W.2d 326, 329 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985), overruled on other grounds by Woods v. State, 956 S.W.2d 33 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). However, when he affirmatively states he has no objection to the evidence at the time it is sought to be admitted at trial, he waives error. Jones v. State, 833 S.W.2d 118, 126 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 921, 113 S.Ct. 1285, 122 L.Ed.2d 678 (1993); Moody v. State, 827 S.W.2d 875, 889 (Tex. Crim. App.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 839, 113 S.Ct. 119, 121 L.Ed.2d 75 (1992); Gearing v. State, 685 S.W.2d at 329. At the time the cocaine was offered into evidence, appellant stated that he had "[n]o objection." Therefore, he has waived his complaint, and we must overrule the issue. Issue Two - Evidence of Ownership In his second issue, appellant contends the trial court erred in admitting evidence uttered by an LISD police officer (Lucio Trevino) about the LISD's ownership of real property within the drug free zone and in admitting a 1995 deed without further proof that ownership of the property had not subsequently changed. We overrule the issue. Officer Trevino testified that he worked for the LISD Police Department and was responsible for patrolling its property in North Central Lubbock. He also stated that the Pete Ragus Aquatic Center was in his district, as was the Lubbock High School tennis courts next to it. Appellant objected, however, to his testimony that the property was owned by the LISD because the officer had no personal knowledge of that. Assuming arguendo that the admission of these utterances constituted error, we note that Officer Bernal and Louis Dean Wood (an LISD employee) also testified, without objection, that the property alluded to by Trevino was owned by the LISD. So, any error in the admission of Trevino's comments was cured when the same evidence came in elsewhere without objection. Hudson v. State, 675 S.W.2d 507, 511 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984); McGee v. State, 35 S.W.3d 294, 301 (Tex. App.--Texarkana 2001, pet. ref'd). Appellant also contends that the trial court should not have allowed the admission into evidence of a 1995 warranty deed through which the subject property was deeded to the LISD. This is so, he argues, because it was irrelevant. Furthermore, it was allegedly irrelevant because the State failed to prove that the LISD still owned the property in March 2002, i.e. the date the crime occurred. Relevant evidence is evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more or less probable than it would be without the evidence. Tex. R. Evid. 401. Additionally, we review the decision to admit the evidence under the standard of abused discretion. Moses v. State, 105 S.W.3d 622, 627 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003). Next, we note that the warranty deed was not the only evidence illustrating ownership of the property; again, Officer Bernal and Louis Dean so testified. Moreover, a witness also described how tennis courts and an aquatic center were built on the property for a local LISD high school and for LISD students and how those facilities were currently being used by the high school and students. So, the deed, when coupled with the other testimony we described in this paragraph, rendered more probable the fact that the LISD owned the property in March of 2002. Consequently, the decision to overrule appellant's objection on the basis of relevance was not an abuse of discretion. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. Per Curiam Do not publish.