Hoffman v. Morel

SUMMARY ORDER Appellant Barbara Hoffman, a lawyer appearing pro se, appeals from a district court order awarding her attorney’s fees in the amount of $164,580.70. Hoffman moved pursuant to New York Judiciary Law § 475 (“section 475”) to fix the vaiue of her charging lien on an underlying judgment in favor of her former client in quantum meruit. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal. “We review a district court’s award of attorney’s fees for abuse of discretion.” Cabala v. Crowley, 736 F.3d 226, 229 (2d Cir.2013); see also Sequa Corp. v. GBJ Corp., 156 F.3d 136, 149 (2d Cir.1998). A district court’s factual findings, “including those based on documentary evidence and inferences drawn from other facts,” are reviewed for clear error, and may only be reversed when the reviewing court is “ ‘left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.’ ” Garcia v. Teitler, 443 F.3d 202, 211 (2d Cir.2006) (quoting United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395, 68 S.Ct. 525, 92 L.Ed. 746 (1948)). An attorney who has been discharged without cause has three remedies — a retaining lien, a charging lien, and a plenary action in quantum meruit; these remedies are cumulative, not exclusive. Levy v. Laing, 43 A.D.3d 713, 843 N.Y.S.2d 542, 544 (2007) (citing Butler, Fitzgerald & Potter v. Gelmin, 235 A.D.2d 218, 651 N.Y.S.2d 525, 527 (1997)); see also Universal Acupuncture Pain Servs., P.C. v. Quadrino & Schwartz, P.C., 370 F.3d 259, 264 n. 6 (2d Cir.2004). Section 475, which “governs attorneys’ charging liens in federal courts sitting in New York,” Itar-Tass Russian News Agency v. Russian Kurier, Inc., 140 F.3d 442, 448 (2d Cir.1998), provides that, “[f]rom the commencement of an action, ... the attorney who appears for a party has a lien upon his or her client’s cause of action, .. . which attaches to a verdict, report, determination, decision, award, settlement, judgment or final order in his or her client’s favor, and the proceeds thereof in whatever hands they may come.... ” N.Y. Jud. Law § 475. “A charging lien ... is equitable in nature, and the overriding criterion for determining the amount of a charging lien is that it be ‘fair.’ ” Sutton v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth., 462 F.3d 157, 161 (2d Cir.2006) (citations omitted) (quoting Cohen v. Grainger, Tesoriero, & Bell, 81 N.Y.2d 655, 602 N.Y.S.2d 788, 622 N.E.2d 288 (1993)). When determining a section 475 charging lien on a quantum meruit basis, “[ajmong the factors to be considered ... are the difficulty of the matter, the nature- and extent -of the services rendered, the time reasonably expended on those services, the quality of performance by counsel, the qualifications of counsel, the amount at issue, and the results obtained (to the extent known).” Sequa Corp., 156 F.3d at 148. Upon review, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion by reducing Hoffman’s requested hourly rate and estimated hours worked to calculate a presumptively reasonable fee. The district court’s consideration of the hourly rate referenced in the retainer agreement was reasonable. See Crescent Publ’g Grp., Inc. v. Playboy Enters., 246 F.3d 142, 151 (2d Cir.2001). Furthermore, although *88 there is no bar to Hoffman’s reliance on reconstructed records to serve as the basis for compensation, the district court did not abuse its direction by reducing the claimed number of hours reasonably required for the representation in view of the imprecise nature of Hoffman’s accounting. See F.H. Krear & Co. v. Nineteen Named Trustees, 810 F.2d 1250, 1265 (2d Cir.1987) (“[T]he burden is on counsel to keep and present records from which the court may determine the nature of the work done, the need for it, and the amount of time reasonably required; where adequate contemporaneous records have not been kept, the court should not award the full amount requested.” (citing cases)). “The award of [prejudgment] interest is generally within the discretion of the district court and will not be overturned on appeal absent an abuse of that discretion,” except where such interest is awarded “as a matter of right” under New York law. New England Ins. Co. v. Healthcare Underwriters Mut. Ins. Co., 352 F.3d 599, 603 (2d Cir.2003). Section 5001(a) of the New York Civil Practice Law and Rules provides that prejudgment interest is mandatory except “in an action of an equitable nature.” N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5001(a). New York case law holds that prejudgment interest is mandatory with respect to a quantum meruitcause of action, see, e.g., Tesser v. Allboro Equip. Co., 73 AD.3d 1023, 904 N.Y.S.2d 701, 705 (2010); Ogletree, Deakins, Nash, Smoak & Stewart, P.C. v. Albany Steel, Inc., 243 A.D.2d 877, 663 N.Y.S.2d 313, 315 (1997), 1 which is a claim sounding in quasi-contract, Hudson View II Assocs. v. Gooden, 222 A.D.2d 163, 644 N.Y.S.2d 512, 516 (1996). However, a section 475 charging lien is “equitable in nature.” Sutton, 462 F.3d at 161. Hoffman did not bring a plenary action in quantum meruit; and she cites no authority suggesting that the use of quantum meruit to set the amount of her charging lien affects its equitable nature, or that prejudgment interest is mandatory on such a claim. Therefore, Hoffman can neither demonstrate that prejudgment interest must be awarded “as a matter of right” nor that the district court abused its discretion by not awarding interest. We have considered all of Hoffman’s remaining arguments and find them to be without merit. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the order of the district court. Footnotes [1] But see Precision Founds, v. Ives, 4 A.D.3d 589, 772 N.Y.S.2d 116, 120 (2004) (asserting, without analysis, that prejudgment interest is discretionary on quantum meruit claims).