Fitzgerald v. . Shelton

Mkrkimon, J., (after slating the case). The defendant did not plead a counter claim, and the new matter of defence alleged by him in his answer was properly taken as denied by the plaintiff. The Code, §268. They were to be treated bv the Court-and the defendant, as having denied that their *523 ancestor liad executed such deed as that alleged in the answer, and the defendant had notice to be prepared to establish it against any attack that they could make upon it. The defendant might have moved that the plaintiff be required to make reply to the new matter alleged in the answer, as allowed by the statute, (The Code, §248), but he did not do so. ■ Ordinarily, a party can anticipate the objection to a deed or other instrument to be produced by him on the trial in a case like this, but if in some cases he could not, the Court might, in a proper case, require the opposing party to give notice of the grounds of attack, or if a party should-be surprised on the trial, the Court might, for just cause, direct a mistrial, or after the verdict, grant a new trial. It is not required in actions to recover land that the pleadings shall allege or set forth a summary of the evidence of title, or particularly how it is proposed to establish it. Each party is expected to go to trial prepared to pi’ove his case, and to have the evidence produced by him thoroughly scrutinized, tested and resisted, just as in other actions. In actions generally, each party produces his evidence without any notice to the opposing party of its nature. In this case the'defendant did not need to allege the deed in question. Ho might have put it in evidence on the trial without notice of it to the plaintiffs. Ho that the first exception cannot be sustained. Jones v. Cohen, 82 N. C., 75. The defendants counsel relied upon Riggan v. Green, 80 N C., 236. That case is not pertinent here. In it the parties relied upon equities alleged in the pleadings. This is simply a case at law. No equity is alleged or relied upon. A very great variety of facts oftentimes make evidence tending to prove the insanity of a person alleged to be insane. If his general course of conduct, his methods of business, his particular business transactions, his conversation, his declarations made from time to time, his ordinary speech, his speech and his actions on particular occasions, his man *524 ners, his habits, are very eccentric, foolish, unnatural, absurd and shocking to reasonable people, what he so says and does is evidence going to prove that he is insane. Such evidence would be stronger or weaker in proportion to the degree of absurdity, unreasonableness, and unnaturalness of what such person so did and said — it might be very strong — it might be so slight as not to be sufficient to go to the jury at all. Merely immoral, vicious and criminal acts would not of themselves be evidence oi insanity — they might be, in connection with other facts. In an inquiry in such respect, it becomes necessary and pertinent to scrutinize the transactions, declarations and conduct of the party whose sanity is in question, with a view to ascertain whether or not the same are indeed absurd, unreasonable and unnatural. It is not every act that seems to be thus that is so in fact; it frequently turns out that what so appears is just the reverse, and tends to prove the intelligence and wisdom of the person doing the act in question. Hence, explanatory evidence as to the reasonableness, naturalness, justice and wisdom of the particular acts or transactions relied upon as evidence of insanity, is competent. In the case before us, no particular facts or evidence were relied upon to prove the insanity of the person whose sanity is in question. His general conduct, his business transaction, some- of them, and the opinion of a physician constituted the evidence relied upon. We think, therefore, that the Court erred in rejecting the evidence — the letter and the deed offered by the defendant explanatory of the motives and considerations that prompted the maker of the deed in question to execute it. The letter written by himself, at the time he executed the deed, states why he did so, and it was proper that what he said in that connection should go to the jury to help them to determine the condition of his mind at that time. And the deed offered in evidence also, was some evidence of what he paid *525 for the land he purchased at the sale of the administrator, and the character of the transaction as reasonable or otherwise. Wood v. Sawyer, Phil. 251. The defendant is entitled to a venire de novo. Error. Reversed.