Pelletier v. . Saunders

Rodman, J. The question presented in this ease is, whether a Probate Court at the instance oí a creditor, can compel the administrator of the debtor to sell his lands, for the payment of his debts, after the personal estate has been exhausted. The Act of 1868-9 ch. 113, siA chapter 5. s. 1, p. 26T, provides that in such a case the administrator may apply, to the Superior Court, tor an order to sell the real property ; but it makes no express provision tor the relief ot the creditor when the administrator refuses or unduly dela_ys to apply. The word may, here, as in every act imposing a duty, means shall. By Superior Court, is meant the Clerk of the Court, as appears by section 48, of the same chapter, and from S. 9, C. O. P., where that is defined to be the meaning of the phrase, in every case, except when some act is required to be done during Term time, or the Judge of the Court is otherwise expressly indicated. So there is no difficulty about the right ot the creditor to have the order made, or the duty of the administrator to apply for it, or the jurisdiction of the Court on his application. The question then is reduced to this: Is there anything in the Act referred to, or in the Constitution and limited powers of the Probate Court, to disable it from making the order at the instance of a creditor ? The Act prescribes who are the parties necessary, in all cases, to a proceeding for the sale of the lands. The creditors are not necessary parties. Nevertheless, as they have an interest, as well in the taking ot the administration account, as in the terms on which the land shall be sold, and the application of the proceeds, they must have a right to bocomé parties at some stage of the proceeding, (C. C. P., S. 61, ex parte Moore, 64 N. C. 90), and we cannot see that any inconvenience, or injury to any interest, can-arise by allowing them to come in at the beginning, by commencing the proceeding. Mere matters of practice and form, unless expressly reg *263 ulated by statute, are entirely under the control of the Courts, and every mode ot proceeding is allowed, by which rightful relief may be obtained without injury or inconvenience. It is suggested, however, that if the Clerk shall, at the hearing, order the administrator to sell, he will have no power to enforce obedience, in case the administrator refuses. The same may be said in case of disobedience to an order to sell made on the application of the administrator. So that if the want of power were conceded, it would be no more an argument against the jurisdiction in the former case, than in the latter, where it is not disputed. But the want of power is cot conceded. It is unnecessary fqr us to say how the order might be enforced. Pei’haps the administrator might be removed for the misconduct, although not exactly of the nature specified in sections 89-91, of sub-chapter YII of the Act of 1868-9. And no reason occurs to us at present why disobedience could not be treated as a contempt under the Act of 1870-71, ch. 216. At all events, if it should he found that the process of the Probate Court was inadequate to enforce its orders, application could be made to the Judge of the Superior Court for aid, by an oi’der in the nature of an injaction. Sprinkle v. Hutchinson, 66 N. C. 450. The judgment of the Superior Court is reversed, and the demurrer overuled. The case is remanded, to be proceeded in according to law. Let this opinion be certified. Pee Cuelam. Judgment reversed.