Caldwell County v. . Doughton

Adams, J. The plaintiff alleges, and by demurring the defendants admit, that on 25 October, 1919, the Watts Company listed its real property in Caldwell County at an accepted valuation of $250,000; that on the first Monday in April, 1923, the board of commissioners, *64 pursuant to the Public Laws of 1923, ch. 12, sec. 124, determined by resolution that taxable property in the county had been assessed at its true value in money; and that real property therein should be entered on the tax books for the next quadrennial period at the value previously assessed; also that on 18 June, 1923, the Watts Company, having sold a part of its land listed the remainder at an accepted valuation of $213,016. The mill was sold to A. L. Watts on 3 April, 1926, and on 2 July, 1926, the land, then reduced to 595 acres, was listed for taxation at $171,991, a sum approved by the county authorities as a proper basis for the assessment of taxes. In 1923 the land owned by the Watts Company was given an assessed value for the next four years. Public Laws 1923, ch. 12, secs. 114, 120. The board of county commissioners constituted the board of equalization in each county (sec. 18) or the board of equalization and review (sec. 122); but it was provided in section 18 that the board should not increase or diminish the assessed value of any lands, except in the year in which the lands were valued for taxation, unless such valuation were affected by extraordinary circumstances, the facts in connection with which were to be found by the board. Whether the difference between $213,016, the assessed value of the land on 18 June, 1923, and $171,991, the assessed value on 2 July, 1926, was a diminished valuation or an apportionment of the assessed value among the Watts Company and the purchasers of parts of the land, we need not inquire; for the property in question was listed after the sales at a valuation which was acceptable to the plaintiff. In addition to the sections heretofore cited from the act of 1923, the Machinery Act of 1925 contains a provision for specific complaints in reference to the valuation of land. The board of county commissioners is authorized to hear and determine specific complaints of overvaluation or undervaluation of any particular tract of real property after the general equalization order has been made — -the aggrieved party to file with the clerk of the board sometime in May or June of the current year an application in the prescribed form. Public Laws 1925, ch. 102, sec. 109. The act of 1927, continues all the foregoing sections and provides that the application for relief shall be heard not later than 15 July, and that any property owner may except to the order of the board of county commissioners and appeal therefrom to the Board of Assessment by filing written notice of such appeal and the grounds therefor with the board of commissioners within ten days after final action and by filing with the Board of Assessment notice of such appeal and a copy of the statement of the grounds therefor within ten days after filing such notice with the board of commissioners. Thereupon the Board of Assess *65 ment must fix a time for tbe bearing and after observing tbe required formalities may reduce, increase, or confirm tbe valuation determined by tbe commissioners. It is admitted that neither tbe Watts Company nor A. L. Watts observed any of these statutory requirements at any time. Tbe only semblance of observing them was bis conference with tbe chairman of tbe board of county commissioners in April, 1927, when tbe board was not in session; and after tbe board bad made an order declining bis application for relief be neither excepted nor appealed. Tbe first step in tbe present proceeding was tbe filing by A. L. Watts of a written application in tbe office of tbe Board of Assessment in Raleigh for a reduction in tbe valuation of tbe mill property.' Tbe application was filed on 25 May, 1927; but before this time tbe act of 1925, cited in bis brief and apparently relied on by tbe appellee Watts (Public Laws 1925, cb. 102, sec. 5, subsec. 3), bad been superseded by tbe act of 1927. Public Laws 1927, cb. 71, sec. 5, subsec. 3. Tbe latter act went into effect 9 March, 1927. Tbe section on which tbe appellees base their agreement (act 1925, supra,) authorized tbe Board of Assessment: “To receive complaints as to property liable to taxation that has not been assessed or of property that has been fraudulently or improperly assessed through error or otherwise, and to investigate tbe same, and to take such proceedings and to make such orders as will correct tbe irregularity complained of, if found to exist. Tbe said board shall constitute a State board of equalization of valuation and taxes. In case it shall be made to appear to tbe board that any tax list in any county in tbe State is grossly irregular, unlawfully or unequally assessed, it shall be tbe duty of tbe board to correct such irregularities, and to equalize tbe valuations of property, in a particular county, upon complaint to it of particular taxpayers, or upon its own initiation, under rules and regulations prescribed by it, not inconsistent with this act.” Upon tbe admitted facts it is manifest that tbe property was neither fraudulently nor improperly assessed in 1923, and that the first clause of tbe section is not controlling. Tbe last clause affords relief against “any tax list which has been irregularly, unlawfully, or unequally assessed.” Tbe purpose contemplated is revision of tbe “tax list,” whether upon complaint of individual taxpayers or upon tbe initiative of tbe board. Whether tbe section'is applicable to tbe appellee’s petition is a matter of grave doubt; but if it is, we are still of opinion that there was error in granting tbe relief sought. Tbe appellee’s petition is addressed to a reduction in value of tbe mill property as a whole; tbe plaintiff’s complaint is based primarily upon tbe Board of Assessment’s power to reduce tbe value of tbe real property owned by tbe Watts *66 Company or by Watts individually. Affixed to tbe complaint is a list of tbe property returned for taxation: 595 acres valued at $171,991; total value of all real and personal property on 1 May, 1926, $183,116. Tbe order of tbe Board of Assessment reducing tbe total valuation to $100,000 necessarily involves reduction in tbe valuation of tbe real property — and tbis reduction, tbe appellant contends, was not made in compliance witb law. Moreover, in 1927, the General Assembly amended the section we have quoted by adding' this proviso: “Provided,, that no appeal shall be considered or fixed values be changed, unless notice of the same is filed within ninety days after the final values are fixed and determined by the board of commissioners of the county.” Public Laws 1927, ch. 71, sec. 5, subsec. 3. This being the only provision in the section for an appeal, it may be regarded as a legislative interpretation that without the proviso the statute contemplated an appeal from the board of commissioners, as essential to the exercise of jurisdiction in matters of this kind by the Board of Assessment; and such legislative construction though not controlling is entitled to respectful consideration. Sash Co. v. Parker, 153 N. C., 130; Kornegay v. Goldsboro, 180 N. C., 441. This conclusion is fortified by section 110 of the act of 1927 (ch. 71), which in like manner provides for an appeal from the board of county commissioners. The Watts Company did not contend that its property was overvalued in 1923, or at any other time; and A. L. Watts, who bought the property on 3 April, 1926, made no formal complaint to the board of county commissioners. His informal statement to the chairman was made, not in “May or June of the current year” (Laws 1925, ch. 102, sec. 109), but in the month of April, 1927; and on 12 August, 1927, the Board of Assessment ordered that the revaluation be assessed as of 1 May, 1926. We understand it not to bave been tbe intention of tbe General Assembly to confer upon tbe State Board of Assessment original jurisdiction to bear and determine at all times indiscriminate complaints by individual taxpayers of tbe overvaluation of their property, but as to controversies similar to tbis, which arise upon tbe admitted allegations of tbe complaint, to confer jurisdiction to review tbe final orders of tbe county board of equalization in thé manner provided by law. In tbe case before us tbis course was not pursued, and as tbe proceeding before tbe State Board of Assessment was not authorized by statute it must be dismissed. Tbe judgment of tbe Superior Court is Reversed.