Grimes v. . Guion

"WiNBORNE, J. The ruling of the court in sustaining demurrer ore tenus to the further defense set up by defendant, Amelia Guion, finds support in the case of Wood v. Tinsley, 138 N. C., 507, 51 S. E., 59, upon authority of which judgment below must be affirmed. The decision there is epitomized in the headnote: “Since the Connor Act (Laws 1885, ch. 147), one who goes into possession of land under a parol contract to convey, paying the purchase money and making improvements thereon, cannot assert the right to remain in possession until he *679 is repaid tbe amount expended for tbe purchase-money and improvements as against a purchaser for value from the vendor, holding under a duly registered deed, though the purchaser had notice of the contract.” See, also, Smith v. Fuller, 152 N. C., 7, 67 S. E., 261; Wood v. Lewey, 153 N. C., 401, 69 S. E., 268; and Eaton v. Doub, 190 N. C., 14, 128 S. E., 494. The Connor Act, now C. S., 3309, provides that “no conveyance of land, or contract to convey, or lease of land for more than three years shall be valid to pass any property, as against creditors or purchasers for .a valuable consideration, from the donor, bargainor or lessor, but from the registration thereof within the county where the land lies.” The Court, in Wood v. Tinsley, supra, speaking of that Act, said: “The purpose of the statute was to enable purchasers to rely with safety upon the examination of the records, and act upon the assurance that, as against all persons claiming under the ‘donor, bargainor, or lessor,’ what did not appear did not exist. That hardships would come to some in applying the rigid statutory rule was well known and duly considered . . . The change in our registration laws was demanded by the distressing uncertainty into which the title to land had fallen in this State ... If the defendant has sustained an injury by the conduct of the person with whom he made a parol contract, which should have been in writing and recorded, it is to be regretted, but it is not the fault of the law. Its protective provisions are clear and explicit. To permit him to disregard it at the expense of the plaintiff, who has obeyed it, would be to seriously impair the value of the statute and return to many of the evils which its enactment sought to remove.” In Wood v. Lewey, supra, plaintiff relying solely upon the fact that defendants had notice of his prior unacknowledged and unregistered deed, the Court said that the proposition is too well settled against him to admit of debate, for no notice, however full and formal, can supply notice by registration as required by the statute. Revisal, 980, now C. S., 3309. The present ease is distinguishable from the two lines of eases relied upon by defendant appellant. First: The line to which Vann v. Newsom, 110 N. C., 122, 14 S. E., 519, and others of similar import belong, where the Court holds that the vendor, in a parol contract to convey land, will not be permitted to evict a vendee who has entered and made improvements until the latter has been repaid the purchase money and compensated for betterments. See, also, Ballard v. Boyette, 171 N. C., 24, 86 S. E., 175, where Allen, J., states that: “While the doctrine of enforcing a parol contract to convey land upon the ground of part performance does not prevail in this State, it is well settled that the owner of land who has entered into a contract of this character cannot repudiate *680 the contract and retain the benefits which he has received under it, whether in the form of money paid upon the purchase price or upon the enhanced value, of the land by reason of improvements.” In the case in hand the plaintiff is not the vendor with whom the defendant contracted, but is a purchaser from the heirs of the vendor and has and asserts a duly recorded deed, which is attacked only upon the ground that plaintiff took it with notice of defendant’s verbal contract with and consequent equities against the parol vendor and, hence, is not a purchaser for value without notice. This principle is inapplicable here. Second: The line to which Spence v. Pottery Co., 185 N. C., 218, 117 S. E., 32, belongs, wherein the Court holds that “There are certain parol trusts, and those created by operation of law, dealing with interest in land which are fully recognized in this jurisdiction. And . . . those resting in parol, or not evidenced by any writing, may be enforced against the holder of the legal title unless it appear that such holder or someone under whom he claims has acquired his title for a fair and reasonable price and without notice of the trust.” In the present case no such trust is averred. Though the defense attempted to be set up by defendant portrays hel-as the victim of a grievous wrong which engenders indignation and invokes sympathy, it states no cause of action against plaintiff. There is no averment that he has either assumed, or broken any obligation to her. Rather, the averments indicate that he has acted within the registration laws as written. The judgment is Affirmed.