Eller v. Arnold

WiNBORNE, J. The question here is this: Does the complaint state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action against defendants Douglass and Bazakis, or either of them ? In the light of applicable principles of law in effect in this State, and considering as true the allegations of fact alleged in the complaint, we hold that the question must be answered in the negative. It is noted at the outset that plaintiff does not allege that he had a contract with either defendant Douglass or defendant Bazakis. But it is alleged in effect that the defendants conspired to defraud plaintiff of his commissions, that is, that they unlawfully interfered with his contract with defendant Arnold. In this connection, accepting as true the allegation that plaintiff secured froin defendant Arnold the exclusive right to sell the house in question for a definite period, the agreement therefor would not be effective as against purchasers for value unless it were registered as required by statute, G.S. 47-18, the Connor Act of 1885, Chapter *421 147, later C.S. 3309. See also Bruton v. Smith, 225 N.C. 584, 36 S.E. 2d 9, and compare Winston v. Lumber Co., 227 N.C. 339, 42 S.E. 2d 218. The Connor Act, G.S. 47-18, provides, among other things, that no contract to convey land shall be valid to pass any property as against purchasers for a valuable consideration, from the bargainor, “but from the registration thereof within the county where the land lies . . .” This act protects purchasers for value against an unregistered contract to convey land, that is, where' an owner of land contracts to convey land, such contract, until registered in the county where the land lies, is ineffective as against any who purchases for value from him. Durham v. Pollard, 219 N.C. 750, 14 S.E. 2d 818, and cases cited. Applying the statute, the Connor Act, the decisions of this Court are uniform in holding that no notice however full and formal will take the place of registration. Among the cases so holding are these: Wood v. Tinsley, 138 N.C. 507, 51 S.E. 59; Smith v. Fuller, 152 N.C. 7, 67 S.E. 261; Wood v. Lewey, 153 N.C. 401, 69 S.E. 268; Eaton v. Doub, 190 N.C. 14, 128 S.E. 494; Turner v. Glenn, 220 N.C. 620, 18 S.E. 2d 197; Grimes v. Guion, 220 N.C. 676, 18 S.E. 2d 170. And, while in this State an action will lie against a person who, otherwise than in a legitimate exercise of his own rights, procures the breach of a contract, Elvington v. Shingle Co., 191 N.C. 515, 132 S.E. 274, the principle does not apply in respect to an unregistered contract to convey land. Bruton v. Smith, supra. However, if the contract be registered as required by law, it does apply. Winston v. Lumber Co., supra. In the Bridón case, this Court held that the failure of the plaintiff to have his contract to convey land registered in the public registry left the appealing defendant free to purchase without incurring any liability to plaintiff. And in the Winston case, the Court, holding that standing timber is a part of the realty, stated: “Where there is a duly registered contract to sell and convey timber, any interference with the relation and rights created thereby is a violation of a legal right recognized by law . . . for which an action will lie for the recovery of compensatory damages.” Thus the line of demarcation as to liability for interference with contracts to convey land is distinctly drawn. That is, until such contract is registered, third parties may deal with the property to which it relates as if no contract existed. Moreover, this Court treating the subject of a conspiracy, in the case of S. v. Martin, 191 N.C. 404, 132 S.E. 16, adopted this quotation from Ballentine v. Cummings, 70 Atl. 548, “Whether it is a wrongful or illegal conspiracy depends not upon the name given by the pleader, but upon the quality of the acts charged to have been committed. If these acts are not wrongful or illegal, no agreement to commit them can properly be called an illegal and wrongful conspiracy.” And in Bell v. Danzer, 187 *422 N.C. 224, 121 S.E. 448, the Court, quoting from Cooley on Torts, 685, said: “ ‘The exercise by one' of a legal right cannot be made a legal wrong to another.’ ” See also Bruton v. Smith, supra. Applying these principles to the case in hand, the complaint fails to allege such a state of facts as would put defendants Douglass and Bazakis on legal notice of the existence of the contract, that is, the complaint fails to allege that the contract plaintiff had with Arnold was registered as required by the statute, Gr.S. 47-18. In the absence of such notice these defendants had the legal right to deal with the property to which the contract relates as if no contract existed. Hence, no cause of action is stated against them. Other grounds upon which appellants rely need not- be considered. For reason here stated, the judgment below overruling the demurrers of defendants Douglass and Bazakis is Reversed.