Carter v. Connecticut General Life Insurance

Stacy, C. J., after stating the case: The evidence fails to show: (1) total and permanent disability of insured during period of employment as defined in the policies, or (2) written notice of disability to superior while the insured was in the employ of the Gulf Companies, or within sixty days thereafter. These are conditions precedent to the right of recovery under the policies in suit. It is. true, the insured’s physician gave it as his opinion that on 17 October, 1931, the last time he waited upon him, “the boy was unable to do any kind of work at that time, or pursue any kind of occupation.” Nevertheless, plaintiff’s intestate did actually perform all the duties pertaining to his employment, at regular wages, during the month of January, 1932, until his employment ceased, and also in the following June and July. These were not trifling or minor jobs, on part-time basis, as was the case in Smith v. Equitable Assurance Society, 205 N. C., 387, 171 S. E., 346, strongly relied upon by plaintiff. They were regular full-time positions, which were filled in an entirely satisfactory manner and without complaint of any kind. *668 The case is controlled by the decisions in Hill v. Ins. Co., 201 N. C., 166, 176 S. E., 269; Boozer v. Assurance Society, 206 N. C., 848, 175 S. E., 175, and Thigpen v. Ins. Co., 204 N. C., 551, 168 S. E., 845. There is a natural feeling that after an insurance company has received its premiums, it ought not to be allowed to escape liability or to-avoid responsibility, and the just rule is that policies will be construed strictly against the insurers and in favor of the assured. Conyard v. Ins. Co., 204 N. C., 506, 168 S. E., 835. “The policy having been prepared by the insurers, it should be construed most strongly against them.” Bank v. Ins. Co., 95 U. S., 673; 14 R. C. L., 926. But it is not the province of the courts to construe contracts broader than the parties have elected to make them, or to award benefits where none were intended. Guarantee Co. v. Mechanics Bank, 183 U. S., 402. The letter of plaintiff’s intestate’s physician written under date of 3 November, 1931, at the request of the employer’s agent, could hardly be regarded as written notice of disability under the policies in suit, for the reason it was not so intended (Trust Co. v. Asheville, 207 N. C., 162, 176 S. E., 268), and it negatives rather than affirms the probable permanency of plaintiff’s intestate’s disability. Guy v. Ins. Co., 207 N. C., 278, 176 S. E., 554. This statement of the physician would not bar a recovery, if, in fact, the disability were permanent. Fields v. Assurance Co., 195 N. C., 262, 141 S. E., 743. But' the letter is not regarded as adequate, if relied upon as notice of total and permanent disability. Wyche v. Ins. Co., 207 N. C., 45, 175 S. E., 697. Under the facts in evidence, plaintiff’s intestate was not entitled to-recover at the time the policies in suit were terminated. The motion to nonsuit should have been allowed. Reversed.