State Ex Rel. Solicitor v. Johnson

Allen, J. Tbe Revisal of 190S, see. 231, provides: “No person who shall have been duly licensed to practice law as an attorney shall be debarred or deprived of bis license and right so to practice law, either permanently or temporarily, unless be shall have been convicted, or in open court confessed himself guilty, of some criminal offense showing him to be unfit to be trusted in tbe discharge of tbe duties of bis profession, and unless be shall be debarred according to tbe provisions of tbis chapter.” Tbis was brought forward from the act of 1871, cb. 216. Tbe act of 1907, ch. 941 (Revisal, sec. 211a), in part, provides: “An attorney at law must be debarred and removed for tbe following causes by tbe Superior Court: (1) Upon bis being convicted of a crime pun- *801 isbable by imprisonment in tbe penitentiary.” Tbe other provisions of tbe act of 1907 need not be considered, because not material bere. Before tbe act of 1871 it was held, in Moore, ex parte, 63 N. C., 397, and Biggs, ex parte, 64 N. C., 202, tbat tbe common-law power of tbe court could be exerted iñ tbe case of an attorney wbo bad shown himself to be an unworthy member of tbe profession, and it is generally understood tbat tbe act of 1871 was passed in consequence of these decisions. Tbe construction of tbe act of 1871 is tbat it “takes from tbe court this common-law power to purge tbe bar of unfit members, except in specific cases, and it fails to provide any other power to be used in its place; it is a disabling and not an enabling statute, tbe whole purpose seeming to be to tie tbe bands of the court,” Kane v. Haywood, 66 N. C., 1; but tbat it does not destroy tbe inherent powers of tbe court essential to tbe administration of justice. Ex parte Schenck, 65 N. C., 253; Kane v. Haywood, 66 N. C., 1. Tbe Court said in Ex Parte Ebbs, 150 N. C., 44, in reviewing tbe acts of 1871 and 1907: “We do not entertain any doubt tbat, notwithstanding tbe restrictions placed upon tbe courts by tbe statute, ample power exists to protect them and their suitors from indignity, fraud, dishonesty, or malpractice on tbe part of any of its. officers in tbe discharge of their official duties. It is manifest, however, tbat for tbe commission of crimes which seriously affect their moral character, but have no direct connection with their practical and immediate relation to tbe courts, tbe power to disbar attorneys is restricted by tbe express language of tbe statutes to convictions of tbe class of crimes named in tbe statutes. To give any other construction to tbe statute would not only do violence to well settled principles, but might lead to results not contemplated by tbe Legislature. “Tbe next step in legislation is tbe act of 1907, and as tbe respondent cannot be disbarred under tbat, as there is no allegation tbat be has been convicted of a felony, and can be under tbe act of 1871 if it is in force, having been convicted of a criminal offense, provided it is found as a fact tbat be is unfit to discharge tbe duties of bis profession, tbe decision of tbe appeal depends on tbe question whether tbe act of 1907 repeals tbe act of 1871. “Tbe later act does not purport to repeal tbe former, and a repeal by implication will not be adopted if»by any reasonable construction tbe two acts can be reconciled and can stand' together. “Coke says: ‘It must be known tbat forasmuch as acts of Parliament are established with gravity, wisdom, and universal consent of tbe whole realm for tbe advancement of tbe commonwealth, they ought not, by any constrained construction out of tbe general ambiguous words *802 of a subsequent act, to be abrogated, but ought to be maintained and supported with a benign and favorable construction.’ Dr. Foster's case, 11 Rep., 63. Sedgwick thus expresses the same idea: ‘In this country it has been said that laws are presumed to be passed with deliberation, and with full knowledge of all existing ones on the same subject; and it is therefore but reasonable to conclude that the Legislature in passing a statute did not intend to -interfere with or abrogate any prior law relating to the same matter, unless the repugnancy between the two is irreconcilable, and hence a repeal by implication is not favored; on the contrary, courts are bound to uphold the prior law if the two acts may well subsist together.’ “Potter’s Dwarris on Statutes, 156, 157: ‘Every effort must be made to make all the acts stand, and the later act will not operate as a repeal of the earlier one if by any reasonable construction they can be reconciled.’ ” These quotations from the authorities are taken from the opinion of Associate Justice Walker in S. v. Perkins, 141 N. C., 800, where they are approved. Are, then, the two acts irreconcilable? ¥e think not. They deal with different conditions and act upon different persons and serve purposes that are not the same. The act of 1871 refers to persons convicted of “some criminal offense,” and these cannot be disbarred unless the offense is of such character as to show them to be unfit to discharge the duties of their profession, while the act of 1907 deals only with those convicted of felony, and they must be disbarred. When the two acts are read together, they fit into each other and make one harmonious whole, and, so considered, the legislative intent is that attorneys convicted of a felony must be disbarred, and those convicted of a less offense may be, if it is found as a fact that the criminal offense is of such character as to render them unfit to practice law; and this is the clear intimation in In re Ebbs, 150 N. C., 44, where the Court says: “It is insisted that, however this may be in regard to the act of 1907, the respondent may be disbarred by the court under the power conferred in section 211, Revisal. It is suggested that this statute is by implication repealed by the act of 1907. We incline to the opinion that the last statute is not in conflict with sections 211 and 212 of the Revisal.” Reversed.