Hart v. Board of Commissioners

*164 Brogden, J. Cbapter 545, Public-Local Laws of 1925, authorizes the board of commissioners of Burke County in tbeir discretion “to cause a revaluation and assessment to be made of all tbe real estate and personal property in Burke County liable for taxation, in tbe manner provided in chapter 12, Public Laws 1923, and to levy taxes thereon based upon such revaluation and assessment ... as now provided by law.” Tbe controversy between tbe parties arises from tbe construction of this act of tbe Legislature. Tbe plaintiffs contend: First, That said act is a revenue act, and therefore under Article II, sec. 14, of tbe Constitution, tbe act should have been “read three several times in each House of tbe General Assembly and passed three several readings, which readings shall have been on three different days, and agreed to by each House respectively, and tbe yeas and nays on tbe second and third readings of tbe bill entered on tbe journal; second, that tbe defendants adopted a nonuniform method of making valuations and assessments; third, that no proper notice was given by tbe bpard of equalization of its meeting to equalize tbe assessments made under tbe act referred to. Article II, sec. 14, of tbe Constitution, establishes tbe method by which revenue bills must be passed by tbe Legislature. But tbe question standing at tbe threshold of this aspect of tbe case is whether or not tbe act in question is, as a matter of fact, a revenue bill. “Revenue bills, as defined by law, are those that levy taxes in tbe strict sense of tbe word and are not bills for other purposes which may incidentally create revenue.” 1 Story Constitution, sec. 880; Twin City National Bank v. Nebeker, 167 U. S., 196; 42 L. Ed., 134; Millard v. Roberts, 202 U. S., 429; 50 L. Ed., 1090; Anderson v. Ritterbusch, 98 Pac., 1002; 26 R. C. L., sec. 55; Northern Counties Investment Trust v. Sears, 35 L. R. A. (O. S.). In the Anderson case, supra, tbe act under consideration was “An act for tbe discovery of property not listed for taxation, providing for its assessment and collection of taxes thereon.” Tbe Court held that this was not a bill for raising revenue, placing its decision upon tbe principle announced by Judge Story. Indeed,, an examination of tbe act discloses that it was obviously designed to authorize tbe revaluation of property in Burke County, and expressly provided that taxes should be levied “as now provided by law.” Therefore, tbe act was not a revenue bill, but in tbe nature of a machinery act, and hence did not require compliance with Article II, sec. 14, of tbe Constitution. Tbe second contention of tbe defendant is based upon tbe idea that there were inequalities in tbe assessment of property. “It has -been said that perfect uniformity and perfect equality of taxation, in all tbe *165 aspects in which the human mind can view it, is a baseless dream. With reference to' locality, a tax is uniform when it operates with equal force and effect in every place where the subject of it is found, and with reference to classification, it is uniform when it operates without distinction or discrimination upon all persons composing the described class.” R. R. v. Lacy, 187 N. C., 615; Edge v. Robertson, 112 U. S., 580; 28 L. Ed., 798; Cooley on Taxation, ch. 6; Lacy v. Packing Co., 134 N. C., 567; S. v. Denson, 189 N. C., 173. However, the law in its wisdom has created tribunals to equalize values and to correct inequalities, to wit, county boards of equalization and the State Board of Assessment. The third contention of the plaintiff raises the question as to whether proper notice was given by the board of equalization. It is a sound and just principle of law and one worthy of acceptation that “absence of notice or opportunity to be heard, violates the due process of law provision.” Lumber Co. v. Smith, 146 N. C., 199; Markham v. Carver, 188 N. C., 615. The trial judge found as a fact that the board of commissioners of Burke County met as a board of equalization on the second Monday in July as required by law, and finding that the assessors had not completed the work assigned, deferred consideration of all complaints, and set 22 September, 1925, as the time for hearing complaints of citizens as to the valuation placed upon their property, and that, in addition to verbal notice generally given by said board, the following written notices were given of the time when complaints would be heard, same being published in the News-Herald, a newspaper liublished in Morganton, Burke County, in the weekly publication or issue of 10 September, 1925: “Monday, 21 September, hearing tax complaints. The county commissioners have set aside Monday, 21 September, as the time for hearing tax complaints,” and the said newspaper in its issue on 16 September, 1925, contained the following notice: “Tuesday, the 22nd, is the day for tax complaints. Attention is called to the fact that Tuesday, 22 September, is the date set by the county commissioners for hearing tax complaints. By error, it was given in last week’s paper as Monday, the 21st.” Chapter 12, Public Laws of 1923, sec. 70, provides for “notice in one newspaper, or by poster put up,” etc. The law is that the board of equalization must meet on the second Monday of July and continue until the work of revision is completed; that it must fix a time for hearing of complaints, and that notice of such hearing must be given. Comrs. v. R. R., 86 N. C., 541; Wolfenden v. Comrs., 152 N. C., 84; Markham v. Carver, 188 N. C., 615. After the board has completed its work of revision it cannot thereafter increase valuation without special notice to the taxpayers. Wolfenden v. Comrs., 152 N. C., 84; Markham v. Carver. 188 N. C., 615. *166 Tbis record discloses tbat tbe board of equalization could not complete its work at tbe July meeting because tbe assessors bad not completed tbe work of assessing property in Burke County. It was therefore tbe duty of tbe board to adjourn until tbis preliminary work could be completed. Tbis tbe board did. It was also tbe duty of tbe board to give reasonable notice of tbe time set for bearing complaints of property owners. Tbe board performed tbis duty in a substantial manner. Tbe plaintiffs did not appeal from tbe assessments made by tbe board of equalization of Burke County. It is a generally accepted principle of law tbat in cases of tbis sort a taxpayer is not allowed to resort to tbe courts until be bas first pursued and exhausted tbe remedies before tbe administrative boards established by law for such purposes. Thus in Mfg. Co. v. Comrs., 189 N. C., 103, Hoke, C. J., says: “From a consideration of these and other pertinent provisions of tbe law, it is clear, in our opinion, tbat tbe State Board of Assessment is given supervisory powers to correct improper assessments on tbe part of tbe local boards, and tbat on complaint made in apt time and on notice duly given and on sufficient and proper proof before tbis State board, plaintiff could have obtained or bad full opportunity to obtain tbe relief be now seeks. Tbis being true, tbe judgment of bis Honor sustaining tbe demurrer must be upheld, for it is tbe accepted position tbat a taxpayer is not allowed to resort to tbe courts in cases of tbis character until be bas pursued and exhausted tbe remedies provided before tbe duly constituted administrative boards having such matters in charge.” We must bold, therefore, tbat tbe judgment as rendered be Affirmed.