Khan v. Southern Univ

United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit F I L E D In the August 19, 2005 United States Court of Appeals Charles R. Fulbruge III for the Fifth Circuit Clerk _______________

m 03-30169 _______________

IMOGENE KHAN, ET AL.,

Plaintiffs,

RICHARD EUGENE EARLY,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

VERSUS

SOUTHERN UNIVERSITY & AGRICULTURAL & MECHANICAL COLLEGE BOARD OF SUPERVISORS; BENJAMIN PUGH; GRADY MORRIS; JEANETTE WILLIAMS; SAM GILLIAM; JAMES BROWN, INDIVIDUALLY AND IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS CHANCELLOR OF THE SOUTHERN UNIVERSITY-SHREVEPORT CAMPUS; JUANITA MORRIS,

Defendants-Appellants.

_________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana m 5:00-CV-255 ______________________________

Before GARWOOD, SMITH, and CLEMENT, Early as Assistant Chief.2 Pugh returned Early Circuit Judges. to regular duty in November 1999.

JERRY E. SMITH, Circuit Judge:* Defendant Grady Morris also applied for the position of Police Chief. He was a subor- Stating, without explanation, only that there dinate Police Officer II under Khan and Early are genuine issues of material fact, the district until he was promoted to Interim Chief in No- court denied the defendants’ motion for vember 1999 and permanent Chief in June summary judgment and to dismiss for failure to 2000.3 He was married to Juanita Morris, a state claims upon which relief may be granted. classified civil service clerical worker. Defendants appeal the interlocutory order be- cause it denies qualified and sovereign When Southern appointed Khan Interim immunity. We affirm in part, reverse in part, Chief, Early supported her efforts and directly dismiss in part, and remand.

I. 2 According to Early’s brief, he received an A. associate degree from Southern in 1997 and a The former plaintiff, Imogene Khan, began bachelors degree from Louisiana Tech in 1998. He working in the police department of Southern was also completing an MBA program at Central UniversitySSShreveport (“Southern”) in Michigan University. He served as a Southern 1990.1 While at Southern, Khan was both the police officer, and his evaluations were consistently only white and the only female member of the strong. Southern police force. Sam Gilliam, who 3 served briefly as interim Chancellor until April Early alleges the following facts in his brief: 1, 1999, appointed her to the interim position that he scored several points higher than Khan on of Lieutenant/Chief in January 1999. the civil service exam, but she had more tenure; that Morris’s performance history was inferior to that of Khan, whose evaluations reflected her supe- During her tenure as interim chief, Khan rior record; and that Morris was permitted to resign applied for permanent appointment to that po- rather than face disciplinary action for un- sition. She was the most senior member of the acceptable conduct. Morris also worked at the force, and her performance evaluations were Caddo Parish Sheriff’s Office as a corrections of- exemplary. When Khan became Chief on ficer and a communications/radio room operator; January 6, 1999, Ben Pugh, Southern’s Vice- he resigned after being recommended for termina- Chancellor, temporarily appointed Richard tion. He was subject to disciplinary action for sleeping on the job and being away from his work area on repeated occasions. He had two prior ar- rests: one for false imprisonment that was ex- * punged in 1997, and one for issuing worthless Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has de- termined that this opinion should not be published checks. and is not precedent except under the limited cir- cumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4. On his civil service application for police chief, Morris apparently responded that he had never 1 Khan settled claims against the defendants; we resigned from a job to avert termination. Southern discuss facts surrounding her claims only to the learned that he had falsified his application in that extent they are material here. respect.

associated with her. Early made his support Amendment and qualified immunity claims. for her public and also disclosed that he had They devote most of their argument to the observed race and sex discrimination against substantive merits of the various claims. To her. the extent that this appeal is from an interlocu- tory order, we consider only those issues eli- Early alleges that he suffered severe retalia- gible for interlocutory review. tion as a result of his support for Khan by seeking to place him on the midnight shift and Generally we do not have jurisdiction over accusing him of stealing computers. Southern denials of motions to dismiss or motions for authorities ultimately divested Early and Khan summary judgment, because such pretrial or- of certain supervisory responsibilities, includ- ders are not final decisions for purposes of 28 ing the ability to discipline inferior officers and U.S.C. § 1291, which provides that courts of perform background checks. appeals have jurisdiction over appeals from final decisions of the district courts. There Khan and Early took sick leave in October are, however, exceptions for certain types of 1999, citing the stress and harassment they immunity rulings. were experiencing. Early claims that Southern officials made it difficult for him to obtain his II. pay by questioning his exercise of sick leave. A. Southern terminated Early in March 2000, and The district court denied defendants’ mo- Khan in May 2000. tion to dismiss and motion for summary judg- ment that were based on sovereign immunity.4 In December 1999 Khan signed EEOC The collateral order doctrine furnishes us with questionnaires containing specific claims of jurisdiction over an interlocutory appeal from discrimination. She signed a formal charge a denial of a summary judgment motion as- that the EEOC sent to Southern in November serting sovereign immunity.5 The defendants of 2000. In September 2001 the EEOC issued contend that the denial of the motions to dis- Khan a right to sue letter. miss and for summary judgment was error. This is a legal question that we review de B. novo. See Koehler v. United States, 153 F.3d Early makes a variety of allegations against 263, 265 (5th Cir. 1998). Southern and against its officers in their offi- cial and personal capacities. These allegations include title VII claims based on race and sex discrimination, title VII claims based on race 4 The district court actually refused to dismiss and sex retaliation, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 claims all claims insofar as the defendants moved to dis- based on racial discrimination and retaliation, miss them based on sovereign immunity. We mere- a variety of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims, 42 ly identify title VII and § 1983 because they are the U.S.C. § 1985 conspiracy claims, and several only two issues sufficiently briefed such that we 42 U.S.C. § 1986 claims. may render an informed judgment. 5 See P.R. Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf The defendants challenge the order denying & Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139, 144-45 (1993); Mc- their motion to dismiss. They premise appel- Carthy ex rel. Travis v. Hawkins, 381 F.3d 407, late jurisdiction for this issue on Eleventh 411-12 (5th Cir. 2004).

B. Louisiana law provides that “[n]o suit against Southern maintains that there is an Eleventh the state or a State agency or political subdivi- Amendment sovereign immunity bar to Early’s sion shall be instituted in any court other than title VII claims. The Supreme Court rejected a Louisiana court.” LA. R.S. 13:5106. More- Southern’s position long ago, holding that a over, we are not permitted to interpret waiver private citizen can sue a state for title VII of immunity in state law courts as a waiver of damages in federal court.6 immunity in federal courts.9 The inquiry, how- ever, does not end there. The two sides devote considerable space in their briefs to whether Louisiana has waived its This court takes a case-by-case approach to sovereign immunity. This argumentation determining whether a state is the real party in entirely misses the mark, for private citizens interest in suits brought against entities that may pursue title VII actions in federal court appear to be alter egos of that state. See Rich- not because Louisiana has waived sovereign ardson v. S. Univ., 118 F.3d 450, 452 (5th Cir. immunity, but because Congress has abrogated 1997). A federal court “must examine the par- it.7 ticular entity in question and its powers and characteristics as created by state law to deter- C. mine whether the suit is in reality a suit against Congress may abrogate Eleventh Amend- the state itself.” Laje v. R.E. Thomason Gen. ment immunity, or states may waive it, but in Hosp., 665 F.2d 724, 727 (5th Cir.1982). this instance Louisiana has not waived its im- munity in federal court for state law claims.8 In deciding whether a suit against an entity is in reality a suit against the state, several fac- tors must be determined: (1) whether the state 6 See Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 456 statutes and caselaw characterize the agency as (1976); Usery v. La. ex rel. La. Dep’t of Health & an arm of the state; (2) the source of funds for Hosp., 150 F.3d 431, 435 (5th Cir. 1998). the entity; (3) the degree of local autonomy 7 the entity enjoys; (4) whether the entity is con- See Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, cerned primarily with local, as opposed to 55 (1996) (stating the circumstances under which statewide problems; (5) whether the entity has Congress may abrogate state sovereign immunity). Denials of motions to dismiss and motions for sum- authority to sue and be sued in its own name; mary judgment in the title VII context do not and (6) whether the entity has the right to hold constitute final pretrial orders. See Jackson v. City of Atlanta, Tex., 73 F.3d 60, 62 (5th Cir. 1996). We dismiss the appeal with respect to all title VII claims, except to the extent that those appellate 8 claims sound in sovereign and qualified immunity. (...continued) We therefore do not opine on either on (1) whether state, or any state agency, board, commission, or Early has complied with title VII’s administrative political subdivision of the state receiving services requirements or (2) whether there are sufficient from an employee and, in return, giving compensa- issues of material fact to preclude summary tion fo any kind to an employee.” LA. R.S. 23:302. judgment with respect to title VII. 9 See Great N. Life Ins. Co. v. Read, 322 U.S. 8 Louisiana defines an employer as “. . . the 47, 54 (1944); Martin v. Univ. of Louisville, 541 (continued...) F.2d 1171, 1175 (6th Cir. 1976).

and use property.10 Although there is some tent it turns on an issue of law.13 Such juris- language suggesting that there are situations in diction does not allow the reviewing court to which Southern should not be treated as a reach the merits on an interlocutory appeal. state entity, we have held that it is entitled to See Felton v. Polles, 315 F.3d 470, 477 (5th Eleventh Amendment immunity if the state Cir. 2002). does not waive it. See Richardson, 118 F.3d at 454-56.11 The test for whether qualified immunity applies asks (1) whether plaintiff has alleged a D. violation of a clearly established constitutional For the reasons discussed above, Southern or statutory right and (2) if so, whether his is subject to suit only if Congress intended to conduct was objectively unreasonable in light abrogate state sovereign immunity. Section of the clearly established law at the time the 1983 does not abrogate Eleventh Amendment incident took place. See Felton, 315 F.3d at immunity, and Louisiana has not waived it. 477. The second prong of this task actually Champagne v. Jefferson Parish Sheriff's Of- subdivides into two inquiries: (a) whether the fice, 188 F.3d 312, 314 (5th Cir. 1999).12 Any allegedly violated rights were clearly estab- § 1983 suit against a defendant in his official lished at the time of the incident and capacity must therefore be dismissed. (b) whether the violators’ conduct was objec- tively unreasonable in light of those rights. III. See id. Qualified immunity is appealable to the ex- A. Qualified immunity serves to “shield a 10 See Delahoussaye v. City of New Iberia, 937 government official from civil liability for dam- F.2d 144 (5th Cir.1991); Tradigrain v. Miss. State ages based upon the performance of dis- Port Auth., 701 F.2d 1131 (5th Cir.1983) (making cretionary functions if the official’s acts were the analysis for purposes of diversity jurisdiction). objectively unreasonable in light of then clearly 11 established law.” Thompson v. Upshur Coun- Although Louisiana’s assessment of whether ty, Tex, 245 F.3d 447, 456 (5th Cir. 2001). Southern is a state agency is not binding on federal Where a defendant pleads qualified immunity, courts, it is worth noting that Article VIII, Sec. 7 of the Louisiana constitution considers the the burden of proof shifts to the plaintiff. See Southern University System a Louisiana state Pierce v. Smith, 117 F.3d 866, 872 (5th Cir. agency. Southern is, under the constitution, a sys- 1997) (internal quotations and citations tem under the control and management of its omitted). Board. The standard of review for an interlocutory 12 Moreover, we do not reach the question order denying a summary judgment motion whether Congress intended to abrogate state sover- sounding in qualified immunity differs some- eign immunity for §§ 1981, 1985 and 1986, be- what from the standard usually applied to sum- cause those issues are inadequately briefed by both sides. We do clarify, however, that certain state entities do in fact enjoy Eleventh Amendment 13 immunity from both § 1981 and § 1983 claims. See Southard v. Bd. of Crim. Justice, 114 See Loya v. Tex. Dep’t of Corrections, 878 F.2d F.3d 539, 548 (5th Cir. 1997) (quoting Mitchell v. 860, 861 (5th Cir. 1989). Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 530 (1985)).

mary judgment motions. Ordinarily we re- because the factual predicates are not view a summary judgment de novo, viewing available.15 the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant. See Hare v. City of Corinth, The appeal o f the substantive title VII is- Miss., 135 F.3d 320, 325 (5th Cir. 1998). Be- sues is DISMISSED for want of appellate jur- cause of our limited appellate jurisdiction over isdiction. The order is REVERSED insofar as interlocutory orders, however, we cannot re- it denies immunity under § 1983 to defendants view whether the evidence “could support a in their official capacities, and insofar as it de- finding that particular conduct occurred.” nies sovereign immunity on state law claims. Behrens v. Pelletier, 516 U.S. 299, 313 The order is AFFIRMED insofar as it denies (1996). We must take as given the facts that summary judgment relating to title VII im- the district court assumed when it denied sum- munity claims. This matter is REMANDED as mary judgment, and we determine whether to claims of qualified immunity and for further those facts state a claim under clearly estab- proceedings as needed. lished law. See Nerren v. Livingston Police Dep’t, 86 F.3d 469, 471 (5th Cir. 1996).14

B. The individual defendants are victims of a sparingly worded order denying their motions. All the order states is that “genuine issues of material fact remain.” We cannot sit as fact- finder.

The district court makes no attempt to in- dicate for which motions those “issues of ma- terial fact remain.” Our problem is that, to re- view an interlocutory order involving a denial of a summary judgment motion sounding in qualified immunity, we must take the facts as the district court took them, but the order does not reveal how the district court viewed the facts in relationship to each qualified immunity claim. We must therefore remand all questions involving qualified immunity (and not 15 foreclosed by our sovereign immunity rulings), Specifically, we remand for more factual ela- boration any qualified immunity claims in regard to §§ 1981, 1983, 1985, and 1986. We do not mean 14 For example, the panel may review matters to suggest that immunity status turns on the same such as (1) whether the right is clearly established evidence for each statute, but merely that we lack and (2) to the extent that the relevant discrete, the evidence we need to review meaningfully any historic facts are disputed, the objective reason- qualified immunity determination under any ableness of the defendants’ conduct. See Pierce v. standard. See generally Johnson v. Jones, 515 Smith, 117 F.3d 866, 871 (5th Cir. 1997) (internal U.S. 304, 317-18 (1995) (stating conditions under citations omitted). which interlocutory appeal may be dismissed).