Perry v. . Young

*466 Shepherd, J.: It was expressly agreed between the plaintiff and Bullock that the title to the mule should remain in the plaintiff until the payment of the purchase-money. Beyond all question, this constituted a conditional sale. Frick v. Hilliard, 95 N. C., 117, and the cases cited. Such a transaction stands upon.the same basis as a bailment, and, apart from the Act of 1883 (The Code, §1275), is valid, not only between the parties, but as against all the wmrld, without registration. Possession is only presumptive evidence of ownership, and the principle caveat emptor applies to all who may deal with those in possession. A bailee may sell the property entrusted to him, but the purchaser thereby acquires no title against the true owner. Clayton v. Heder, 80 N. C., 279; Butts v. Screws, 95 N. C., 218; Frick v. Hilliard, supra. Did the exchange of the mule for the horse vest the title to the latter in Bullock? We are unable to see how it could have that effect. The mule was in the possession of Bullock, as the plaintiff’s bailee, and the trade was effected by the consent of the plaintiff, with the express understanding that the horse should stand in the place of the mule. This could have no other effect than to vest the title to the horse in the plaintiff, and the fact that the horse was to stand in the place of the mule, to secure the payment of plaintiff’s debt, is perfectly consistent with a conditional sale, as in such cases the title is retained for that very purpose. These transactions having occurred prior to the Act of 1883, requiring the registration of such conditional sales, the said act is not applicable. Its operation is prospective onlju Harrell v. Godwin, 102 N. C., 330. It must follow, therefore, that as Bullock was holding the horse under a conditional sale, and has paid no part of the purchase-monejq the plaintiff is the owner and entitled to recover. Error.