Trust Co. v. . Currie

Adams, J. It is provided by statute that any judgment of the Superior Court affecting the right to real property or requiring in whole or in part the payment of money shall be entered by the clerk on the judgment docket, and that it may be docketed on the judgment docket of the Superior Court of any other county upon filing with the clerk, thereof a transcript of the original. Such judgment when docketed becomes a lien for a stated period upon the debtor’s real property. The entry must contain the names of the parties, the relief granted, the date of the judgment, the date of the docketing; and the clerk shall keep a cross-index of the whole, with the dates and numbers thereof. C. S., 613, 614. The object of docketing a judgment is to secure a lien, for in the absence of an execution and levy no lien is acquired until the judgment is docketed. Bernhardt v. Brown, 122 N. C., 587, 593. In Lytle v. Lytle, 94 N. C., 683, it is said: “The docketing of a judgment is not an essential condition of its efficacy, nor a precedent requisite to an enforcement by final process. This is only necessary to create and prolong the lien thus acquired, for the benefit of the creditor against subsequent liens, encumbrances and conveyances of the same property.” The necessity of complying with these statutes has been stressed on more than one occasion. “The docketing is required, in order that third persons may have notice of the existence of the judgment lien. ‘The dogget, or, as it is commonly called, the docket or docquet, is an index to the judgment, invented by the courts for their own ease and the security of purchasers, to avoid the trouble and inconvenience of turning over the rolls at large. The practice of docketing judgments seems to have obtained as early as the reign of Henry VIII. . . . Purchasers are not bound to examine for judgment liens further than to look into the proper dockets.’ Freeman on Judgments, sec. 343. The *264 observance of this law is regarded as so important to subsequent purchasers and mortgagees that, wherever the system of docketing obtains, a very strict compliance with its provisions in every respect is required.” —Chief Justice Shepherd in Holman v. Miller, 103 N. C., 119. “The requirement that a cross-index shall be kept is not merely directory — it is important and necessary. It is intended to enable any person to learn that there is a docketed judgment in favor of a certain party or parties, and against certain other parties, and where to find it- on the docket. The inquirer is not required to look through the whole docket to learn if there be a judgment against a particular person — he must be able to learn from such index that there is a judgment against him, and where he can find it on the docket, its nature, .purpose, etc. When there are several judgment debtors in the docketed judgment, the index should and must specify the name of each one, because' the index as to one would not point to all or any one of the others. The purpose is, that the index shall point to a judgment against the particular person inquired about if there be a judgment on the docket against him. A judgment not thus fully docketed does not serve the purpose of the statute, and is not docketed in contemplation of law.” — Chief Justice Merrimon in Dewey v. Sugg, 109 N. C., 329. In Hahn v. Mosely, 119 N. C., 73, the Court, approving the position taken in Dewey v. Sugg, that the names of all the judgment debtors must appear in the cross-index, said: “The docketing creates a lien, and the index and cross-index are provided to facilitate the search for such encumbrances, and hence the name of each defendant must be indexed (Redmond v. Staton, 116 N. C., 140), but as to the plaintiffs, it is sufficient that one name appear, since that indicates the case in which the encumbrance accrued by judgment against the specified defendant, and by turning to the judgment recorded or the judgment roll in such case the full nature and extent of the judgment will appear.” See, also, Redmond v. Staton, 116 N. C., 140; Shackelford v. Staton, 117 N. C., 73; Valentine v. Britton, 127 N. C., 57; Wilson v. Lumber Co., 131 N. C., 163; Wilkes v. Miller, 156 N. C., 428. In this case the requirement of the statute as interpreted in the. decisions has not been observed. Not only the name of the judgment debtor (and if more than one the names of all), must appear in the cross-index, but the name of the plaintiff also. The caption of the transcript from Hoke County is “J. A. Currie v. Carey L. Stephens,” and the endorsement is “J. A. Quick v. Carey L. Stephens.” The title of the judgment entered upon the docket in Lee County is “J. A. Quick v. Carey L. Stephens,” and the entry, “Judgment that the plaintiff recover of the defendant,” etc. While the name of J. A: Currie, the *265 judgment creditor, appears in tbe caption and in tbe body of tbe transcript from Hoke, it does not appear either in tbe index or in tbe judgment as entered upon tbe records in Lee. Tbe insufficiency of tbe index and docketing is tbe only question discussed in tbe briefs, and upon tbe record presented tbe exception to tbe judgment must be sustained. Reversed.