Harrington v. Board of Commissioners

Yasser, J. The only exception by plaintiffs, appellants, is to the judgment and its conclusions of law. It distinctly appears that the Board of Education of Anson County complied, in all respects, with C. S., 5481, in adopting a county-wide plan of organization for the purpose .of promoting a more advantageous school system for the entire county. Ansonville Consolidated School District was formed pursuant to and in accordance with this countywide plan of organization. This plan was adopted 21 July, 1924. A petition for the election in Ansonville Consolidated School District was presented on 23 July, 1924, signed by the requisite number (25) of qualified voters residing in Ansonville Consolidated School District more than twelve months prior to the filing of said petition. The election was held 30 August, 1924. For the special tax 289 votes were cast, and 97 votes against the same, out of a total registration of 458. This election was held in all respects as required by law. The tax levy as contemplated by said election was made by the Board of Commissioners of Anson County on 1 September (first Monday), 1924; and all other requirements of the law were fully met, unless invalidity arises from one of the three sources contended for by plaintiffs. Plaintiffs’ first contention is that a petition for the election was insufficient in that it was not endorsed by “the governing school boards of at least a> majority of the school districts within the special school taxing district,” known as “Ansonville Special School District,” as contemplated in O. S., 5657. C. S., 5657, relates to “special school taxing districts,” and not to “school districts.” Special school taxing districts are created by C. S., 5655; they include territory within more than one school district. *576 Hence, we find tbe legislative requirement in C. S., 5657 that, “the governing school Boards of at least a majority of the school districts within the special school taxing district shall endorse the petition.” In the instant case the election was had pursuant to C. S., 5639, which relates to and is'confined to “school districts.” The petition is sufficient when signed by twenty-five qualified voters, provided the number of qualified voters in said school district equals or exceeds seventy-five, and if less, then only one-third of such number. This petition goes to the county board of education without any indorsement of the governing boards of the “school districts” included therein, because there are no school districts included. A new school district has been formed, and it operates of itself, and not by virtue of any composing units. In Sparkman v. Comrs., 187 N. C., 241, the procedure followed is that required by C. S., 5657; but in the instant case a new school district was created pursuant to the county-wide plan. The notice of the election in the instant case, contained a statement that, if election carried all taxes formerly voted “is hereby voted off.” Hence, the difficulties which were encountered in Hicks v. Comrs., 183 N. C., 394; Perry v. Comrs., 183 N. C., 387; Paschal v. Johnson, 183 N. C., 129, and that class„of cases, were obviated. In fact, when the case of Coble v. Comrs., 184 N. C., 342, marked out the .distinction between “school districts” and “taxing districts,” and held that Article II, sec. 29, of the State Constitution, did not apply to the latter, but did apply to the former, then in full accord with this reasoning, the Legislature enacted chapter 136, Public Laws 1923, creating special school taxing districts (C. S., 5655), and providing a method for creating school districts (C. S., 5481). This applied the principles announced in Coble v. Comrs., supra, to the whole State. In Riddle v. Cumberland, 180 N. C., 321, the same result as to “voting off” former taxing powers was held valid, on similar facts. The election was held in the Riddle case throughout the new school district and not in the hitherto nonlocal-tax territory, but it was then in a new district, and the new school district voted as á unit; so in the instant case. The instant case avoids Perry v. Comrs., 183 N. C., 387, and Hicks v. Comrs., 183 N. C., 394, in that a new school district is formed, and there is no consolidation of districts. No creditors of any former district comprising this new school district appear to exist. Hence, the second contention of the plaintiffs must fail, since this is not a consolidation of previous districts, some of which are special school taxing districts and others nonlocal-tax districts, but a new district has been formed in all respects as required by law, and the instant election removes all former taxing powers if, in fact, they existed, after *577 the adoption of the county-wide plan. Hence, the basis for this contention falls of its own weight. Riddle v. Cumberland, supra; Sparkman v. Comrs., supra. This county-wide plan for the formation of school districts is discussed and upheld in Blue v. Trustees, 187 N. C., 431. The plaintiffs’ next contention is that the commissioners of Anson County had no power or authority to levy the taxes voted at the instant election on the first Monday in September, 1924. Public Laws 1923, ch. 136, sec. 222 (C. S., 5642), provides that such taxes so voted “shall be annually levied and collected in the manner prescribed for the levy and collection of other taxes.” Public Laws 1923, ch. 12, sec. 9,-allows the levying of taxes for general county purposes in the months of July, August and September; this puts the instant case within the express provisions of the law. Therefore, we conclude that the judgment appealed from is correct in law, and therefore it is Affirmed.