Threadgill v. Town of Wadesboro

Hoke, J. There was evidence on tbe part of plaintiff tending to show tbat she and those under whom she claimed bad continuously occupied and possessed this lot under deeds purporting to convey tbe title, since 1848, and asserting ownership to the line of a fence which bad continuously inclosed tbe property for that length of time. As we understand tbe record, there was no substantial dispute as to tbe facts of this occupation inside tbe fence, but it was contended for defendant, and there was evidence on its part tending to show, tbat tbe fence in question was an encroachment on a public street of tbe town to tbe extent of 8 feet, and they bad a right to reassert control of same for tbe public benefit. Under tbe law of this State as it formerly prevailed, title by adverse occupation could be acquired against a municipality. This was established and recognized as a rule of property not only under our decisions applicable to tbe question, Moore v. Meroney, 154 N. C., 163; S. v. Long, 94 N. C., 896; Crump v. Mims, 64 N. C., 767; but tbe principle was embodied in our statute law in 1868, now Revisal, secs. 375 and 381. Section 375 provides: “Tbat tbe limitations prescribed by law shall apply to civil actions brought in tbe name of tbe State or for its benefit *643 in tie same manner as to actions by or for the benefit of private parties,” and section 381 of the statute, especially as to real property: “That all such possession as is described in the preceding section, under such title as is therein described, is hereby ratified and confirmed and declared to be a good and legal bar against the entry or suit of any person, under the right or claim of the State.” Construing these sections, the Court has held that the maxim, “Nullum tempus occwrrit regi” no longer obtains here, even in the case of collecting taxes, unless the statute applicable to or controlling the subject provided otherwise. Wilmington v. Cronley, 122 N. C., 387; Furman v. Timberlahe, 93 N. C., 67. This being the law as it formerly prevailed, the Legislature, in 1891, chapter 224, Eevisal, sec. 389, enacted a statute, “That no person or corporation shall ever acquire any exclusive right to any part of any public road, street, lane, alley, square, or public way of any kind by reason of any occupancy thereof or by encroaching upon or obstructing the same in any way; and in all actions, whether civil or criminal, against any person or corporation on account of any encroachment upon or obstruction of or occupancy of any public way it shall not be competent for any court to hold that such action is barred by any statute of limitations.” At the time this last statute was enacted and under the unchallenged testimony, plaintiff and those under whom she claimed had occupied the property to the line of her fence, asserting ownership, for more than forty years, and it was not then open to the Legislature to reassert the lost ownership of the street except under the power of eminent domain vested in defendant by the law and for the public benefit. Defendant’s entry here, however, was under claim of right and without resorting to this principle. "We were referred by counsel to S. v. Godwin, 145 N. C., 461; Moose v. Carson, 104 N. C., 431; Turner v. Comrs., 127 N. C., 153, as being against the operation of the statute of limitations for plaintiff’s protection. In S. v. Godwin the Court was referring to the law as it should prevail under the last statute on the subject, that of 1891, and in the opinion Associate Justice Walker, referring to the law prior to the statute, was careful to note that the case of Moose v. Carson, 104 N. C., 431, seemed to have overlooked the decision1 of the Court in 8. v. Long, in which it was directly held, as stated, that title by adverse occupation could be acquired against the town. True, the case of Moose v. Carson gives decided intimation to the contrary, and this was approved in the subsequent ease of Turner v. Comrs., supra. But both of these cases seem to have overlooked or ignored the decisions of S. v. Long and Crump v. Mims, and also the statute law on this subject ever since the enactment of The Code of 1868, and by which the maxim of nullum tempus occurrit regi was in effect abrogated. *644 The towns are only supposed to come under tbe influence of this maxim when and to the extent that they are properly considered governmental agencies of the State, and, if the State itself is barred by the statute, its subordinate agents may be barred also. On the particular question now presented, the position for the future is not of great moment, the statute of 1891, Revisal, sec. 389, having established the principle suggested in Moose v. Carson and approved in Turner v. Comrs. as the law on the subject. And even if Moose v. Carson and Turner’s case should be considered as modifying the former law, the first of these cases was not decided by this Court until September, 1889. At that time plaintiff’s title had already matured, and, having been acquired under decisions constituting a rule of property, it could not be affected by judicial reversal of the principle in another case nor disturbed except under the power of eminent domain, as heretofore stated. Hill v. R. R., 143 N. C., pp. 539-573; Kirby v. Boyette, 118 N. C., 244. While we hold that the authorities referred to are, on the evidence, in any aspect of it, decisive of the case in plaintiff’s favor, the position discussed is hardly -open to defendant on the record, because the court below, being of opinion that if the land entered on by defendant had ever been a public street, as claimed, no statute of limitations would apply, submitted the issue to the jury on the question whether there had been any encroachment on the street, and they have determined that essential fact against defendant. In that aspect the case was fully developed and fairly tried, and we find no reason for disturbing the result. As evidence that the streets and squares of the town were as claimed by them, defendants offered an old survey and plat made by David Carpenter in 1848, showing regular squares with streets 66 feet'wide, etc. There was much evidence on the part of plaintiff that this plat was in no wise a correct representation of the plan of the town as laid out in or shortly after 1783, and in order to establish that the plat was correct, Mr. J. A. Little, a witness for defendant, was asked whether he knew that an old locust tree had reputation of being a pointer to a town corner, etc., and objection by plaintiff was sustained. The witness had fully qualified himself to speak to the reputation of this corner, and we do not see that the question was incompetent. . The principle which admits evidence of this character applies to both public and private boundaries. As originally adopted and prevailing in England, it was confined to questions of public boundary, Bland v. Beasly, 140 N. C., pp. 628-630, but the objection may not avail defendant on the record, for witness was allowed to answer the question and speak fully and at large as to the pointer and its placing and the surveys made from it. And the same answer may be made to an objection to a ruling as to the evidence of a witness, E. J. Coxe. He was asked as to the standard *645 width of tbe blocks and streets of tbe town, and be said be bad, in bis investigations, seen an old map of tbe town wbicb bad been lost and a blue-print, which was an exact copy, be bad verified. He was asked if be knew tbe width of tbe streets and blocks as represented by tbe map and by general reputation of tbe town of Wadesboro. On tbe question of general reputation of tbe town, tbe witness bad not qualified himself to speak, for, while such evidence is admissible, it must be fir.st shown, among other things, that tbe same took its rise at a comparatively remote period and always ante litem motam, neither of wbicb was shown; and as to tbe information derived from tbe map, tbe copy wbicb tbe witness verified was introduced on tbe trial and showed tbe blocks and squares to be as be claimed. Tbe plat here would seem to be tbe best evidence, and tbe jury bad tbe benefit of it on tbe issue. As heretofore stated, under tbe view of tbe law as held by tbe trial court, tbe issue was largely a question as to whether there bad been any encroachment on tbe public streets. After a full and fair investigation, it was resolved by tbe jury against defendant,' and we find no error to defendant’s prejudice, certainly that gives it any just ground of complaint. Tbe judgment, therefore, is affirmed. No error. Clark, C. J., dissents.