Norfolk Southern Railroad v. Lacy

Adams, J. This action was instituted in the Superior Court of Wake County on 29 November, 1920, to determine the rights of the plaintiff in regard to the payment of taxes. It involves the construction of certain statutes enacted in 1919 and 1920, a brief review of which is necessary to an understanding of the plaintiff’s position. The Machinery Act of 1919, Public Laws of 1919, ch. 92, contains the provisions herein set out. Section 61 provides that the State Tax Commission, now the State Department of Revenue (Public Laws 1921, ch. 40), shall constitute a board of appraisers and assessors for railroad, canal, and steamboat companies and other companies exercising the right of eminent domain. Section 62 requires an officer of each company to return for assessment and taxation under oath or affirmation all the property belonging to such corporation within the State, described as follows: “The number of mileis of such railroad lines in each county in this State and. the total number of miles in this State, including the roadbed, right of way and superstructures thereon, main and side tracks, depot buildings and depot grounds, section and tool houses, and the land upon -which situated and necessary to their use; water stations and land, coal chutes and land, and real estate and personal *619 property of every character necessary for the construction and successful operation of sucb railroad or used in tbe daily operation, whether situated on the charter right of way of the railroad or on additional land acquired for this purpose, except as provided below, including, also, if desired by the State Tax Commission, Pullman or sleeping cars or refrigerator cars owned by them or operated over their lines: Provided, however, that all machine and repair shops, general office buildings, storehouses and contents located outside of the right of way, and also real and personal property, other than the property as returned above to the State Tax Commission, shall be listed for purposes of taxation by the principal officers or agents of such companies with the list takers of the county where the real and personal property may be situated, in the manner provided by law for the listing and valuation of real and personal property.” Section 64, after prescribing the method of valuing the tangible property and the franchise of. the company, provides in paragraph c that the State Tax Commission on or before 1 September shall certify to the Auditor of the State, chairman of the county commissioners, and the mayor of each city or incorporated town the amount apportioned to his county, city, or town, that all taxes due the State from any railroad company shall be paid by the treasurer of each company directly to the Treasurer of the State within-thirty days after 1 July of each year, and that upon failure to make such payment the company shall be liable to suit and to a penalty of 25 per cent of the tax. In section 67a there is a provision that the taxes due the State shall be paid by the secretary or treasurer of the company to the Treasurer of the State within thirty days after the receipt of a bill for the taxes due; but as we construe the several statutes the two clauses designating the time of payment are not in conflict. By virtue of section 65 the Commission is authorized to give a hearing to any interested company touching the valuation and assessment of its property. If such hearing is not had and there is no other obstacle in the way, the tax should be paid within the time fixed in section 64 (a) ; but if there is a hearing, then within the time fixed in section 67a. However, no question is presented in regard to unreasonable delay in making payment, and we refer to the alleged conflict in deference to the argument advanced by the plaintiff. The following provision .appears in section 88: “All taxes shall be due on the first Monday in October in each year, and on all taxes paid in the months of October and November a discount shall be given to the taxpayer of 1 per cent. All taxes paid in the month of December shall be paid at the net amount charged, and from and after 1 January a penalty of 1 per cent per month shall be charged and collected by the sheriff or tax collector; that is to say, that on all taxes paid in the month *620 of January, after 1 January, a penalty of 1 per cent shall be added on the taxes paid, and in the month of February, after 1 February, a penalty of 2 'per cent shall be added, and an additional penalty of 1 per cent for each additional month of delay in settlement of same.” The plaintiff contends that it is entitled to the discount provided in this section, and the defendant insists that the provision has no application to the taxes which each company is directed to pay to the Treasurer of the State, and that it applies exclusively to taxes paid to the sheriff or tax collector of each county or municipality. In our opinion the defendant’s position is the correct one. The plaintiff was entitled to the benefit of section 88 on all taxes collected by the sheriff or tax collectors of the various counties in which certain of its property was listed by virtue of the proviso in section 62, but not on the taxes payable to the Treasurer of the State under sections 64 and 67a. This is obvious from the context. The discount allowed by virtue of section 88 relates to the tax list placed in the hands of the sheriff for collection and not to taxes paid directly to the Treasurer of the State under'the provisions of section 64 (c) or section 67a. The plaintiff further contends that if this is the correct interpretation, section 88 was enacted in breach of the constitutional requirement that laws shall be passed taxing by a uniform rule all real and personal property, according to its true value in money. Constitution, Art. Y, sec. 3. We do not assent to this proposition. It has been said that perfect uniformity and perfect equality of taxation, in all the aspects in which the human mind can Mew it, is a baseless dream. Edge v. Robertson and Cunard Co. v. Robertson (Head Money Cases), 112 U. S., 580; 28 Law. Ed., 798; State Railroad Tax Cases, 92 U. S., 612; 28 Law. Ed., 663. With reference to locality, a tax is uniform when it operates with equal force and effect in every place where the subject of it is found (Edge v. Robertson, supra), and with reference to classification, it is uniform when it operates without distinction or discrimination upon all persons composing the described class. Tested by this standard, the tax which the plaintiff impeaches cannot be declared void on the ground that it conflicts with the uniformity clause of the State Constitution. Cooley on Taxation, ch. 6; Desty on Taxation, 1119; Gatlin v. Tarboro, 78 N. C., 119; S. v. Powell, 100 N. C., 525; Lacy v. Packing Co., 134 N. C., 567; Land Co. v. Smith, 151 N. C., 70. The plaintiff’s further contention that section 88 denies to it the equal protection of the laws is at variance with the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in Railway Company v. Watts, 260 U. S., 519; 67 Law. Ed., 375, and in Railroad Co. v. Doughton, 262 U. S., 413; 67 Law. Ed., 1051. The judgment of the Superior Court is Affirmed.