Nance v. Carolina Central Railroad

MeRRIMON, J. For the purpose of deciding the questions of law raised by the demurrer, the facts alleged in the complaint must be taken as true, and so accepting them, we are of opinion that the demurrer was properly overruled. It was the obvious duty of the defendant to stop its train at the station named, and permit the plaintiff to get off safely. The usual signal for stopping there was given, and the sneed of the train was slackened, preparatory to a stop. It was proper— certainly not negligent on her part — at the signal, to prepare to get off the train promptly, and as its speed grew slower and yet slower, until it came nearly — almost, to a full stop, to go out of the car on its platform, and step to the platform of the depot, if the latter was conveniently near for this purpose, as it seems, from the pleadings, it was. By nearly — almost—to a full stop, is meant very slow, a slight, gentle, creeping movement — one perceptible, and yet not such as would jerk, jostle, shake, embarrass, or cause an ordinary person to stagger, stumble, or fall, in stepping along in a car, or off one to a conveniently near platform, *623 ■or to the ground, at a convenient place. A. person of ordinary prudence and strength, could easily and safely step along in, and off, a car so moving, without, encountering necessary or probable peril. It might not be very cautious to do so, but surely it would not be such lack of caution and care, as to be negligence, or con tributary negligence, as contended by the appellant. Very certainly, it would not be negligence per se. Moreover, the station named was a regular stopping place, at which passengers got on and off the passenger trains of the defendant. The conductor of the train was expressly informed that the feme plaintiff desired to get off there, and he promised that the train should stop, so that she might do so. She had the right to expect that the conductor would see that she got off safely. The train stopped only in the way described — that is, by coming nearly — almost to a full stop. Why such stop? The reasonable inference was, that it was intended by such stoppage to let passengers get on and off the train ; at least, the feme plaintiff might draw such inference. There was, therefore, at least an implied suggestion from the conductor, that she could do so. She might reasonably act upon the faith of such suggestion. She had the right to believe that she could get off safely and properly, and as she. had such right, to attempt to get off as she did, was not contributory negligence on her part. Lambeth v. Railroad Co.. 66 N. C., 494; Turrentine v. Railroad Co., 92 N. C., 638 ; Manly v. Railroad Co., 74 N. C., 655; Bircher v. Railroad Co., 98 N. Y., 28. The principal allegation of negligence is, not that the train was not completely stopped, but that while the feme plaintiff stepped or was in the act of. stepping, from it to the dépoí-platform, as she might reasonably do, the speed of the train was negligently, violently and unexpectedly increased, whereby she was violently thrown from the car to the ground and injured. This is the substantial ground of complaint. Such sudden, violent and unexpected movement of a train, while passengers are getting on and off a car, is negligence, whether the train be completely stopped, or creeping along. The almost uniform and necessary *624 effect of such movement, is to throw passengers off their balance, and frequently to loose them from such supports as they may have, and cast them headlong to the ground, or against a wall or post. The defendant was bound to guard against such sudden or violent movement of its train, at the time and place indicated, and as it did not, it must he held responsible for the consequences. The allegation of injury in the complaint, might have been more definite and specific, but it is such as that the Court can see the nature of the injury — that it is serious, and such as would naturally much endamage the plaintiff. It gives the defendant such information as will enable it to make any defence it may have. This is sufficient. A material allegation so made is not demurrable. It might be, that the Court would, on proper application, if need be, require the allegation to be made more specific. The second cause of action is very informally alleged, but we think that the demurrer as to it cannot be sustained for the causes assigned. Taking the allegations of paragraph two, in connection with the allegations of the first cause of action, referred to in paragraph one, a cause of action is informally, in substance, stated. This cause of action is not that the feme plaintiff sustained physical injury, but that the defendant failed to stop and let her get off the traiu, as it engaged and was bound to do. This is the allegation embodied, not in very apt words, and surrounded by some redundancy in the allegation, in the second paragraph, aided by the other allegations referred to. That the allegations of the second cause of action are not stated, ■as required by the rule of this Court, (Rule VIII, §2), is not assigned as cause of demurrer. What effect this may have in the further progress of the action, unless the defect shall be remedied, remains to be seen. Let this opinion be certified to the Superior Court, that further proceedings may be had in the action according to law. It is so oi’dered. No error. Affirmed.