Waring v. Betts

Lacy, J., (after stating the case) delivered the opinion of the court. The first question arising here is that raised by the demurrer. The declaration states a good case, and sets forth that on its due day it was duly presented for payment of the sum of money therein specified, required, payment refused, and that it was duly protested, &c. And the defendants’ demurrer to the plaintifi’s declaration was properly overruled. The claim of the defendants is that there was no presentment of the note, because when payment was demanded of the indorser, W. L. "Waring, Jr., manager of the late Business Men’s Bank, Mr. Glenn did not have the note in his possession, and could not have presented it, but as has been seen from the facts found by the jury, payment was refused by Waring, and the note not asked for, but payment refused, and the statement made that he was not authorized to represent .the bank which had ceased to do business and had distributed its assets. Presentment of the bill or note and demand of payment should be made by an actual exhibition of the instrument itself; or at least the demand of payment should be accompanied by some clear indication that the instrument is at hand ready to be delivered, and such must really be the case. This is requisite in order that the drawer or acceptor may be able to judge (1) of the genuineness of the instrument; (2) of the right of the holder to receive payment; and (3) that he may immediately reclaim possession of, upon paying the amount. If, on demand of payment the exhibition of the instrument is not aslced for, and the party of whom demand is made decline on other grounds, a formal presentment by actual exhibition of the paper is considered as waived. Ban. on Neg. Inst., p. 485, § 654, citing Lockwood v. Crawford, 18 Conn., 361, and Fall River Union Bank v. Willard, 5. Metcalf, 216. [52] All the parties subsequent to the principal payer are bound only as his guarantors, and promise to pay only on condition that a proper demand of payment be made, and due notice be given to them in case the note or bill is dishonored. And we repeat this as one of the fundamental principles of the law of negotiable paper; and the infrequency and the character of the circumstances which will excuse the holder from making this demand, and still preserve to him all his rights as effectually as if it were made, will illustrate the stringency of the rule itself. Parsons on notes and bills, Vol. I., 442. The question of excuse, then, will depend upon whether due diligence has been used, and presents the ordinary inquiry as to negligence. The principal excuses resolve themselves into two classes— First. The impossibility of demand. Second. The acts, words, or position of a party, proving that he had no right, or waived all right to the demand of the waiver of which he would avail himself. That impossibility should excuse non-demand is obvious, for the law compels no one to do what he cannot perform. But it must be actual and not merely hypothetical; and though it need not be absolute, no slight difficulty will have this eflect. Id. The circumstances which will excuse a demand are such generally as apply to a failure to present and demand payment within the required time, not absolutely. Parsons, 444, 445. In this case the presentment of the note was not made at bank within the usual bank hours, with the note in possession, but as we have seen, this was excused in this case (1) by the fact that there was no bank to present it at, and (2) because payment was refused upon the ground that the bank had ceased to do business, and its assets distributed, and the note was not asked for, nor required, payment being refused on other grounds, the right to have it produced must be considered as waived. The note, however, was carried, during the day, to the place of business of the late manager of the bank, and the indorser [53] sought to be charged, and this being closed, it was carried to his residence, and that being also closed, it could not be presented to him, and although it was not in banking hours, it was during the day time and before the hours of rest. When the note is payable at a bank, it is to be presented during banking hours; and the payer is allowed until the expiration of banking hours for payment. But when’not to be made at bank, but to an individual, presentment may be made at any reasonable time during the day during what are termed business hours, which, it is held, range through the whole day to the hours of rest in the evening. Parsons, 447, citing Cayuga County Bank v. Hune, 2 Hill, 635; Nelson v. Fotterall, 7 Leigh, 194. And in the case of Fainsworth v. Allen, 4 Gray, 453, a presentment made at 9 P. M. at the maker’s residence, ten miles from Boston, when he and his family had retired, was held sufficient. And in Barclay v. Bailey, 2 Camp., 527, Lord Ellenborough sustained a presentment made as late as 8 P. M. at the house of a trader. It is only when presentment is at the residence that the time is extended into the hours of rest. If it is at the place of business, it must be during such hours when such places are customarily open, or, at least, while some one is there competent to give an answer. Parsons, 448. In this case there was no presentment to the maker, who could not be found, which, however, was unnecessary under section 2842 of the Code of Virginia. The protest was in due form, and duly protested, which was authorized by section 2849 of the Code, although the said note was payable at a bank in this State. And under section 2850 is prima fade proof of the facts stated therein, and are substantially in accordance with the finding of the jury. It therefore appears that such presentment as was requisite was made to the indor-ser and late manager of the bank, and that it was impossible [54] to present the same at the bank named therein, as it had ceased to exist. We must, therefore, conclude that there has been sufficient diligence on the part of the plaintiff, and that the judgment of the court below in his favor was right, and should be affirmed. Jud&meNt affirmed.