Allen v. Killinger

75 U.S. 480 (____) 8 Wall. 480 ALLEN v. KILLINGER. Supreme Court of United States. *483 Mr. J.M. Jewett, for the plaintiff in error. Messrs. Gookins and Roberts, contra. *484 *485 Mr. Justice MILLER delivered the opinion of the court. We are of opinion that the court erred in admitting, against the objection of the defendants, the conversation *486 between Miles Murphy and the plaintiff, in which the plaintiff gives his version of his contract with defendant, Allen. The plaintiff Killinger had an opportunity to give his version of the contract made by Allen with him on behalf of Murphy & Allen, and he did so under oath, and subject to cross-examination. Miles Murphy was the plaintiff's witness, and under oath testified to what he knew. But in the examination of Miles Murphy by the plaintiff's counsel he was asked to detail a conversation which took place between himself and the plaintiff in Indiana, when neither of the defendants were present. The witness stated, among other things, in answer to this request, that he (the witness) knew that the plaintiff had some pork in Chicago, that it had been shipped from Des Moines, and that the plaintiff went on to tell him that he had placed it in Mr. Allen's hands, and that it was sent to Chicago, and that he (the plaintiff) was out $8000 or $10,000. When it is remembered that the only important issue before the jury was, whether Allen's contract with the plaintiff was merely to slaughter and pack for the plaintiff the seven hundred hogs, or whether he had undertaken to forward and sell at Chicago the product of the hogs after they had become converted into pork, the importance of this statement by the plaintiff is obvious. Slaughtering and packing hogs at Des Moines is one business, and buying and selling pork at Chicago, whether on commission or otherwise, is a very different business; and the plaintiff is here permitted to prove what he had told Mr. Murphy about that matter after the controversy had arisen, and when neither of the defendants were present to deny it, or to explain the matter. It does not seem to us that the pledge made here by the plaintiff's counsel (who, when the testimony was objected to, apparently conceded that the question was improper as matters stood), was what was required to admit such testimony, if we suppose the pledge to have been fully redeemed. The rule invoked by the counsel is, that where one person is sent by another to a third party for information in reference to an uncertain or disputed matter, the person sending is *487 bound by the declarations of the party to whom he was referred, as if they were made by himself. But, there is here no statement that the counsel expected to show that Killinger had been sent to Miles Murphy for information as to the extent of Killinger's contract with Allen, or even with Allen and B.F. Murphy, or with any reference to that contract. Such a supposition is absurd, as the plaintiff must have known all about that, while Miles Murphy could know very little. And so the declarations brought out by the conversation that are important are not the declarations of Miles Murphy in answer to a request for information, but they are the declarations of the plaintiff made to Murphy. When the counsel came to fulfil this promise, it is equally clear that B.F. Murphy did not send the plaintiff to Miles Murphy for information, but for money. Killinger was urging B.F. Murphy, in Chicago, to pay him. The firm of Miles Murphy & Co. had failed, and to get rid of Killinger's personal importunities, B.F. Murphy urged him to go and see Miles Murphy, who was then in Indiana, and see if he would not pay him something. This is very clear from Killinger's own statement, being the one relied on by counsel to redeem the pledge to the court. It seems to us that Killinger's statement to Miles Murphy was mere hearsay, made by the plaintiff in his own favor after the controversy had arisen, in the absence of defendants, and its introduction cannot be justified under the settled rules of evidence. But if there ever could have been a justification for such testimony, there can surely be none now. For the plaintiff is permitted now to tell his own story to the jury directly, but under the sanction of an oath, and subject to the test of cross-examination. Shall he also be permitted to prove what he said to a third party about the same matter when he was under no oath, and in no danger of cross-question or contradiction? For this error the judgment must be REVERSED AND A NEW TRIAL AWARDED. *488 Mr. Justice NELSON, with whom concurred Mr. Justice DAVIS, dissenting. The question is, whether the statement of the plaintiff, in his conversation with Miles Murphy, that he had placed the pork in the hands of Allen, that it was sent to Chicago, and that he was out of pocket some $8000 or $10,000, under the circumstances mentioned, was admissible? It occurred in a conversation with a person to whom B.F. Murphy, one of the defendants, had sent the plaintiff to endeavor to obtain from him the proceeds of the pork. Now, this conversation was competent evidence as against B.F. Murphy as it respects the business upon which the plaintiff had been sent; he, B.F. Murphy, had accredited Miles Murphy to speak for him in respect to the transaction, and so far as it might tend to prove the partnership of B.F. Murphy with Allen, competent and pertinent. We agree it was no evidence against Allen, nor does it appear that the court gave it any effect as to him. It is not required that, in proving a partnership, the evidence must be competent as it respects each member of the firm. The proof can be given as bearing separately against each of the parties. Miles Murphy, in response to the mission of the plaintiff, stated that B.F. Murphy was a partner of Allen, and that the firm had received and sold the pork. As this response was competent testimony against B.F. Murphy, it was properly admitted. The whole conversation that occurred, or which related to the business about which the plaintiff was sent, was properly allowed. It was no evidence as against Allen, as we have already said, but was as it respected the other defendant. On this ground we cannot agree to the opinion of the court.