United States v. Glenn Cox

USCA11 Case: 23-13521 Document: 22-1 Date Filed: 05/08/2024 Page: 1 of 3

[DO NOT PUBLISH] In the United States Court of Appeals For the Eleventh Circuit

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No. 23-13521 Non-Argument Calendar ____________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, versus GLENN COX,

Defendant-Appellant.

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Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida D.C. Docket No. 1:88-cr-01013-AW-GRJ-1 ____________________

USCA11 Case: 23-13521 Document: 22-1 Date Filed: 05/08/2024 Page: 2 of 3 USCA11 Case: 23-13521 Document: 22-1 Date Filed: 05/08/2024 Page: 3 of 3

23-13521 Opinion of the Court 3

§§ 922(g)(1), 924(e), because it was not a “covered offense” under the Act. See First Step Act § 404(a); United States v. Files, 63 F.4th 920, 930–31 (11th Cir. 2023) (holding that, even after Concepcion v. United States, 597 U.S. 481 (2022), a district court may not reduce a defendant’s sentence for non-covered offenses). Insofar as Cox ar- gues that his conviction for the firearm offense is invalid because the district court lacked jurisdiction to impose it, section 404 of the Act does not permit relief, and he points to no intervening change in controlling law that entitles him to a sentence reduction for this offense. Any challenge to the validity of his conviction for the fire- arm offense must be brought in a motion to vacate his sentence. See 28 U.S.C. § 2255. Because the government’s position is clearly correct as a matter of law and there is no substantial question as to the outcome of the case, we GRANT the motion for summary affirmance. See Groendyke Transp., 406 F.2d at 1162. AFFIRMED.

Footnotes

[2] Opinion of the Court 23-13521 Before WILLIAM PRYOR, Chief Judge, and JORDAN and LAGOA, Cir- cuit Judges. PER CURIAM: Glenn Cox appeals pro se the denial of his motion for a sen- tence reduction under section 404 of the First Step Act of 2018. Pub. L. No. 115-391, § 404(b), 132 Stat. 5194, 5222. He argues that his conviction for possessing a firearm as a convicted felon, 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1), 924(e), for which he was sentenced as an armed career criminal, violates the Second Amendment and that the district court erred by concluding that the Act did not permit relief. He also argues that the district court lacked jurisdiction to sentence him as an armed career criminal, id., because his conviction for a predicate offense did not become final until after the grand jury returned its superseding indictment. The government moves for summary af- firmance. Groendyke Transp., Inc. v. Davis, 406 F.2d 1158, 1162 (5th Cir. 1969). We affirm. We review whether a district court had the authority to modify a defendant’s term of imprisonment under the Act de novo. United States v. Jackson, 58 F.4th 1331, 1335 (11th Cir. 2023). Alt- hough district courts ordinarily lack the authority to modify a term of imprisonment after its imposition, see 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c), the Act permits district courts to reduce some sentences for offenses involving crack cocaine, see First Step Act § 404(a). The district court correctly determined that it lacked the au- thority to reduce Cox’s sentence for the firearm offense, 18 U.S.C.