In Re Watts and Sachs

190 U.S. 1 (1903) In re WATTS AND SACHS, PETITIONERS. Nos. 15, 16. Supreme Court of United States. Argued April 20, 1903. Decided May 18, 1903. ORIGINAL. HABEAS CORPUS AND CERTIORARI. *16 Mr. David Fairleigh, with whom Mr. Bernard Flexner was on the brief, for the petitioner Watts. Mr. W.H.H. Miller, with whom Mr. W.M. Smith was on the brief, for the petitioner Sachs. Mr. George H. Hester (by special leave), with whom Mr. William Wilhartz was on the brief, for the receiver in bankruptcy of M. Zier & Co. Mr. Solicitor General Hoyt for the United States. *26 MR. CHIEF JUSTICE FULLER, after making the foregoing statement, delivered the opinion of the court. In this matter writs of certiorari as well as of habeas corpus were issued, and the record returned to us includes the evidence below, which was duly preserved by bill of exceptions. The District Court held that a flagrant contempt of the court in bankruptcy was committed on the twentieth of February by the taking of the property of Zier & Company out of the possession of its receiver, in whose hands, in the view of the court, it had been voluntarily placed; and that defendants Watts and Sachs were so connected with that transaction as to subject them to like condemnation. The New Albany Trust Company was appointed receiver of the property of Zier & Company under section 1245 of the Revised Statutes of Indiana, Thornton's Rev. Stat. of 1897, providing that this might be done, "when a corporation has been dissolved, or is insolvent, or is in imminent danger of insolvency, or has forfeited its corporate rights;" and it was directed to complete unfinished contracts but to make no new ones. The winding up of the business was contemplated and entered upon. Whether the transfers of $3100 and $9600 could have been overhauled in that suit we need not inquire, as they were undoubtedly acts of bankruptcy, and as such justified the *27 application to the bankruptcy court. And the operation of the bankruptcy laws of the United States cannot be defeated by insolvent commercial corporations applying to be wound up under state statutes. The bankruptcy law is paramount, and the jurisdiction of the Federal courts in bankruptcy, when properly invoked, in the administration of the affairs of insolvent persons and corporations, is essentially exclusive. Necessarily when like proceedings in the state courts are determined by the commencement of proceedings in bankruptcy, care has to be taken to avoid collision in respect of property in possession of the state courts. Such cases are not cases of adverse possession, or of possession in enforcement of preexisting liens, or in aid of the bankruptcy proceedings. The general rule as between courts of concurrent jurisdiction is that property already in possession of the receiver of one court cannot rightfully be taken from him without the court's consent, by the receiver of another court appointed in a subsequent suit, but that rule can have only a qualified application where winding up proceedings are superseded by those in bankruptcy as to which the jurisdiction is not concurrent. Still it obtains as a rule of comity, and accordingly the receiver of the District Court brought his appointment to the knowledge of the Floyd Circuit Court and requested the delivery of the assets. We think there can be no reasonable doubt that the judge of the Floyd Circuit Court and Messrs. Watts and Sachs entertained the conviction in good faith that the custody of the state court could not be lawfully interfered with by the bankruptcy court by summary proceedings. Their view was that the jurisdiction of the state court having attached, that court was, in all circumstances, entitled to exercise it until voluntarily surrendered. But if the state court had taken into consideration that Zier & Company had committed acts of bankruptcy in the matter of preferential transfers; that the amendatory bankruptcy act of February 5, 1903, provided that acts of bankruptcy would exist if a person "being insolvent, applied for a receiver or trustee for his property or because of insolvency a receiver or trustee has been put in charge of his property under the laws of a State, of a Territory, or of the United *28 States;" and that the intent of the bankruptcy law is to place the administration of affairs of insolvents exclusively under the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy courts, it appears to us that instead of continuing the application of the Federal receiver for three weeks, the court should have directed the surrender of the property to him at once, or at least after the report of its own receiver on returning from Indianapolis. The state court, however, did not approve of the assurance given by its receiver at Indianapolis, and refused to allow the surrender of possession, so that the delivery to Connor by the Trust Company presently made was unauthorized by the court, whose receiver and officer the Trust Company was. We are not now dealing with the right of the District Court to take possession in invitum, but with the voluntary delivery of property by the officer of a court, without the court's consent, and, therefore, unlawful. We say, "voluntary," for we decline to entertain the suggestion that the District Court intimidated the Trust Company and Watts, or that members of the bar can be intimidated in the discharge of their duty. It is true that the state court had authorized the Trust Company and Mr. Watts to appear at Indianapolis and explain the situation, but in doing so it was attempted to limit the operation of the order to a special appearance in the bankruptcy court, while by the order continuing the Federal receiver's application it was attempted to make him a party to the proceedings in the state court and bound by them. Obviously the state court did not wish its receiver to be bound by going before the District Court, and did wish the receiver of the District Court to be bound by his appearance in the state court. On the other hand the District Court made an order on February 17, which recited the presence of the Trust Company and of Watts, the voluntary offer of the Trust Company, with the approval of Watts, in open court, to surrender possession, and then directed Connor to present a certified copy of the order of February 11 to the Trust Company, and thereupon to take possession. Mr. Watts had no notice or knowledge of this order until February 23, and Sachs first saw it on that day, though he was informed of its existence February 22. *29 The situation February 19 was this: The Trust Company and Watts were under rules to show cause for disregard of the orders of the state court. One had done, and the other had advised the doing, that which the state court had not consented to, and it was after it had signified its disapproval that the District Court receiver obtained possession without such consent. The state court thereupon concluded that it was entitled to restore the status quo, and accordingly it entered the orders of February 20, under which Connor was dispossessed. This was a reassertion of the jurisdiction which the state court insisted it was entitled to exercise, that it had not voluntarily parted with, or been lawfully deprived of. The petitioners were sentenced to imprisonment for contempt because of their alleged participation in this action of the state court. It is the action of the state court that was complained of, and the essence of the alleged contempt was that, assuming that action was taken pursuant to the advice of these attorneys, they were liable to condemnation for giving such advice. In the ordinary case of advice to clients, if an attorney acts in good faith and in the honest belief that his advice is well founded and in the just interests of his client, he cannot be held liable for error in judgment. The preservation of the independence of the bar is too vital to the due administration of justice to allow of the application of any other general rule. But here we do not have the ordinary case of advice to clients, but the case of judicial action alleged to have been induced by the advice complained of. The theory of the condemnation is that of conspiracy between the state court and the attorneys to obstruct the administration of justice and to bring the authority of the United States court into contempt. We are of opinion that such charges ought never to be indulged in, and that the ultimate consequences of attacks of such a character by the courts of one government on the courts of another are too serious to allow them to be made. The state court was a court of original general jurisdiction. On the face of its record its jurisdiction had been properly invoked and been properly exercised and was not open to collateral *30 attack. Assuming that the proceedings in bankruptcy superseded further proceedings in the state court, and that nothing remained for the latter but to direct the surrender of the assets and the winding up of the accounts, the District Court was of opinion that it might by summary proceedings take the assets out of the possession of the state court. But Connor's possession was not acquired in that way. The contention is that the property was given up voluntarily by the state court receiver and not in obedience to any order entered on summary proceedings to which that receiver was a party. And the difficulty is that the receiver had no power to make the surrender when it was made. It was the representative of the state court. The property in its hands was property in custodia legis, and it had only such authority as was given to it by the court, and could not exceed the limits prescribed by the court. Without doubt the receiver agreed to give up the property in its hands to the receiver of the court in bankruptcy on the supposition that the state court would assent to its doing so. But the state court took a different view, and therefore the possession of Connor was from its standpoint a wrongful possession. In order to the adequate enforcement of the provisions of the bankruptcy law, it is necessary that the powers of courts in bankruptcy should be, as they are, most comprehensive. Section 720 of the Revised Statutes provides: "The writ of injunction shall not be granted by any court of the United States to stay proceedings in any court of a State, except in cases where such injunction may be authorized by any law relating to proceedings in bankruptcy." By section two of the bankruptcy act of 1898 the bankruptcy courts are empowered to "(3) appoint receivers or the marshals, upon application of parties in interest, in case the courts shall find it absolutely necessary, for the preservation of estates, to take charge of the property of bankrupts after the filing of the petition and until it is dismissed or the trustee is qualified;". . . "(13) enforce obedience by bankrupts, officers, and other persons to all lawful orders, by fine or imprisonment or fine and imprisonment;" . . . "(15) make such orders, *31 issue such process, and enter such judgments in addition to those specifically provided for as may be necessary for the enforcement of the provisions of this act." The twelfth general order in bankruptcy provides: "3. Applications . . . for an injunction to stay proceedings of a court or officer of the United States or of a State shall be heard and decided by the judge." But no writ of injunction as such was granted in this case. The order of February 11, for the appointment of a receiver, provided that the Trust Company should deliver up the property to the Federal receiver and should refrain from interfering with his possession and control of the same. That order was entered on the application of the Inland Steel Company, which had appeared in the state court at the creditors' meeting of January 24, and had interposed no objection to the order then entered for the completion of pending contracts and the running of the plant for that purpose. It was one of the contentions in support of the jurisdiction of the state court that the Inland Steel Company was thereby estopped from resorting to the bankruptcy court and obtaining the appointment of a receiver there. In Simonson v. Sinsheimer, 95 Fed. Rep. 948, it was held by the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, in a careful opinion by Taft, J., that a creditor might be estopped from filing a petition in involuntary bankruptcy, in the circumstances therein detailed, and In re Curtis, 91 Fed. Rep. 737, and 94 Fed. Rep. 630, in which a different conclusion was reached, was distinguished. We express no opinion on the matter, but it should be noted, in passing, as one of the elements of controversy entering into the views of counsel in the state court. The completion of contracts by the state receiver and the procuring of materials therefor had been authorized at the creditors' meeting, in which the petitioning creditor participated, and the work had been entered upon, and it is possible that a state of facts might have existed which would involve the application of the doctrine of estoppel to some extent. We do not understand it to be contended that the passage of the bankruptcy act in itself suspended the statute of Indiana *32 in relation to the appointment of receivers, but only that when the proceedings for such appointment took the form, as they did here, of winding up the affairs of the insolvent corporation, the proceedings in bankruptcy displaced those in the state court and terminated the jurisdiction of the latter. But the acceptance of that view does not necessarily involve the concession that these attorneys were guilty of contempt of the District Court because of the action of the state court. They could not be found guilty because they believed and declared their belief that the state court had jurisdiction and that the District Court had not. Granting that they were mistaken, it does not follow that their mistaken conviction constituted contempt. In point of fact the state court agreed with them, and would certainly not have entered orders of whose validity it entertained any reasonable doubt. The distinction between the exclusive jurisdiction of the court in bankruptcy, proceeding, as it were in rem, to determine the status of a debtor and his assets, and the jurisdiction over property subjected to particular liens, and the like, exercised by courts of concurrent jurisdiction, was probably thought by them not to apply in the circumstances existing here, and advice based on that opinion could not in itself constitute contempt. What evidence is there that these attorneys, or either of them, gave any advice or took any action in bad faith, not in the honest discharge of their duty as counsel, but with the deliberate intent to have the Federal court set at defiance and its orders treated with contempt? When Mr. Watts returned from Indianapolis he had been disabused of his conviction that the District Court would modify its order of February 11, when fully informed of the actual situation of the suit in the state court, and the participation in the proceedings therein of the creditor on whose application that order had been granted, and he appears to have earnestly sought to bring about the delivery over of the property, the discharge of the Trust Company, and the withdrawal from the record of the petition and order of February 14. But he realized, when about to appear before the state court, *33 that his promise to endeavor to bring about the surrender of the property had been made under the pressure of expediency, and not by reason of change of judgment, and that he had placed himself in the embarrassing position of acting without leave and in disregard of the limitations of the order he had himself framed and procured to be entered. This led him to request Mr. Sachs to accompany him as his friend to New Albany, and assist in representing his situation in as favorable a light as possible to the state court. It is not disputed that Mr. Sachs visited New Albany solely in obedience to the dictates of friendship, and that he had no connection whatsoever with the litigation. The result was, however, and it might well have been anticipated, that it appeared to the state court that its jurisdiction had been treated cavalierly by the attorney who had represented the original complainant, who had insisted that the court retained jurisdiction, and who could not deny that he was of the same opinion still. It was then, and on the twentieth, that Mr. Sachs, without the assent or connivance of Mr. Watts, unless suspicion be allowed to supply the want of proof, signed and verified a certain statement by the United States Tube Company, which represented that the Trust Company had "wrongfully, unlawfully and without leave of this court" turned over the possession to Connor, and prayed for its removal, and the appointment of a successor. This statement is recited in the order of that date entered by the judge of the state court, disallowing the application of the Trust Company to resign because of its action "without leave or permission," and stating that "the judge of this court, upon his own motion and because of the open contempt of said receiver for the orders, judgment and process of this court, does now order and direct that said receiver be and it is hereby removed from its trust." The Trust Company was ordered to account immediately for all the assets, and Kelso was appointed as receiver in succession by the judge "upon his own motion," and directed to demand possession of the property, and in case of refusal to report to the judge for further action in the premises. This was followed by the qualification of the new receiver, the demand *34 on Connor, the report of his refusal, the issue of the writ to the sheriff, and its execution. Mr. Sachs testified that on the 19th the judge of the Circuit Court insisted on retaining the property and in declining to approve of the promise Mr. Watts had made; that when it was known that the property had been delivered the judge still declined to discharge Mr. Watts; that on the forenoon of the 20th the judge announced that he had made up his mind to remove the Trust Company and appoint another receiver; that he, Sachs, expressed the opinion that if the judge did that the better procedure would be for the new receiver to interplead in the District Court, setting up all the facts from the beginning and obtaining a determination in that court; that the judge asked Kelso to bring the facts in respect of the delivery of the plant to the official knowledge of the court, when he would remove the Trust Company and appoint Kelso. That in the afternoon Kelso desired him to sign the statement bringing the facts to the court's notice, which he, Kelso, objected to doing, because he was to be appointed receiver, and Sachs signed it supposing the course to be followed would be an application to the District Court in the nature of an interpleader; that he did not know what became of the paper and did not know, until after the commencement of the pending proceedings, what order had been entered upon it; that he did not know that any proceedings were contemplated or in course of preparation or prepared with the view of retaking the property; and did not advise or assist in any such, or believe any such would be undertaken. In seeking to extricate Mr. Watts from his anomalous position, Sachs found himself involved, by the attitude of the state court, in similar embarrassment, for the state court adhered to its views as to jurisdiction, and insisted that it had never voluntarily yielded the position it occupied, which afforded the basis for testing the question. It does not seem to have occurred to Sachs that the mere effort to get an issue which could be transmitted to the District Court for determination subject to petition for review or such other appellate remedy as the bankruptcy act provided, could be regarded as *35 contempt of that court, and want of intention to commit contempt is entitled to great weight in such circumstances. There is some conflict of evidence as to Sachs' participation by way of suggestion in the preparation of papers on the twentieth, or knowledge of the preparation of the final order and writ, but, without attempting to review the evidence and pass upon its weight, we find nothing in this conflict to justify the conclusion of an intention to contemn. State courts are entitled to the assistance of the gentlemen of the bar in the maintenance of their dignity and jurisdiction, and the fearless discharge of their duty by the latter should not be shaken by liability to punishment for mere errors of judgment in rendering such assistance. The presumption on the verified response and plea of Sachs, which was sustained by his testimony, was that he had not been in any way a party to the dispossession of Connor, and had not advised it or expected it; that he not only had not intended any contempt, but had committed none. And as the record of the state court showed that the orders were entered by the judge of that court "upon his own motion," that presumption could not be overthrown without collaterally impeaching the record, and that we think was inadmissible. It has been already assumed that the bankruptcy proceedings operated to suspend the further administration of the insolvent's estate in the state court, but it remained for the state court to transfer the assets, settle the accounts of its receiver and close its connection with the matter. Errors, if any, committed in so doing could be rectified in due course and in the designated way. We cannot but express our regret at the unfortunate collision between the two courts and the belief that the considerate observance of the rule of comity is adequate to avert such occurrences. We are of opinion that there was no legal evidence to sustain these convictions for contempt, and the order in each case must be Petitioner discharged. *36 MR. JUSTICE HARLAN, concurring. I concur in that part of the opinion of the court which shows that there was no evidence whatever upon which to base a judgment for contempt against Watts and Sachs, or either of them. That view of the evidence is sufficient to dispose of the case without reference to any other question arising on the record. My concurrence in the judgment discharging the petitioners is solely on the ground just stated.