Pitts v. LeBlanc

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA WILLIE RALPH PITTS CIVIL ACTION VERSUS NO. 22-1983 JAMES M. LEBLANC, ET AL. DIVISION “5” ORDER AND REASONS Before the Court is the Motion to Dismiss (rec. doc. 27) filed Pbryo D seef endants James LeBlanc, Travis Day, and Floyd Brooks (collectively, “Defendants”). Plaintiff Willie Ralph Pitts filed no opposition to the motion. Also before the Court is a Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c) (rec. doc. 36) filed by Plaintiff. Defendants filed no opposition to Plaintiff’s motion. Having reviewed the pleadings and the case law, the Court — 1 — rI.u les asB faocllkogwrso.u nd Plaintiff sues Defendants under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 , alleging deliberate indifference to Plaintiff’s serious medical needs and living conditions while incarcerated at Rayburn Correctional Center (“RCC”). Plaintiff alleges that he contracted a “serious series of some fungus and black mold eating the flesh all over [his] body.” (Rec. doc. 1 at 7). Plaintiff also alleges that the medical staff at RCC could not find oIdu.t what it was and “continuously sent him to University Medical Center in New Orleans.” ( ). Plaintiff asserts that he still suffers — 1 — On June 28, 2023, the parties consented to proceed before the undersigned pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636 . (Rec. doc. 29). from the “infectious fungus disease” despite receiving a series of different medicIda.tions and — 2 — that the source of his affliction is the unkempt showers and bPartihsorono Lmegs aalt NReCwC.s ( ). Attached to Plaintiff’s Complaint is an excerpt from that reports that medical doctors with disciplinary records have been retained to provide care in institutional settings such as prisons. (Rec. doc. 1-1). Plaintiff alleges that “these things happens [sic] through criminal doctors hired to be care providers.” (Rec. doc. 1 at 11). Plaintiff appears to intimate that the doctors at RCC have been disciplined and had their medical licenses revoked or suspended. Lastly, Plaintiff alleges that Assistant Warden Floyd Brooks and the DirectorI do.f Nurses are “very unprofessional” and need to be replaced due to their “complacency.” ( ). Plaintiff seeks “ciIvdi.l, criminal, and administrative liabilities” iInI.c ludinSgta $n1d5a0r,0d0 o0f. 0R0e vinie mwo netary damages. ( at 5). Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint under both Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). “When a Rule 12(b)(1) motion is filed in conjunction with other Rule 12 motions, the court should coSnesei dRearm tmhein Rg uvl. eU n1i2te(bd) S(t1a)t ejusrisdictional attack before addressing any Hatittat cvk. Cointy t hofe P maesaridtes.n”a , 281 F.3d 158, 161 (5th Cir. 2001) (citing , 561 F.2d 606, 608 (5th Cir. 1977)). “On a Rule 1B2o(ubd)r(e1a)u mx ov.t iLoan. ,S tthaet ep Baratry Assese'nking to invoke federal jurisdiction has the burden [of proof].” , 3 F.4th 748, 753 (5th Cir. 2021). The district court should only grant a Rule 12(b)(1) motion “if it appears certain that the plaintiff cannot prove any — 2 — Plaintiff is currently housed at the Allen Correctional Center in Kinder, Louisiana. Ramming set of facts in support of his claim that would entitle plaintiff to relief.” , 281 F.3d at 161 . In the Fifth Circuit, the standard of review applicable to motions to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1) resembles the standard of review for motions to dismMissa nusnad Meru Rsau lEel 1 v2. (Ubn)i(t6e)d, bStuatt aeslso allows the Court to consider a broader range of materials. Williams v. Wynne, No. 21-cv-968, 2021 WL 4148118 , at *3 (E.D. La. Sept. 13, 2021) (citing , 533 F.3d 360 , 364-65 n.2 (5th Cir. 2008)). Under Rule 12(b)(6), the district court “must accept all Swcehllle-spilnegaedre vd. fEaSc t&s aHs, tIrnuce. and view those facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” True v. Robles , No. 11-cv-294, 2011 WL 3900N57a7p,o aleto *n2 v(.E S.hDo. wLas,. CSaepli t&. 2 W, 2a0ls1h1, )L .(Lc.iPti.ng , 571 F.3d 412, 417 (5th Cir. 2009)); , No. CV 20-1775, 2021 WL 5630895 , at *4 (E.D. La. Dec. 1, 2021). A pBlealiln Atitflf. mCourspt. pv.l eTawdo emnboluygh facts, if taken as true, to state a claim that is plausible on its face. , 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007). A “formulaIidc. recitation of the elements of a cause of action” will not meet this pleading standard. at 555. Plausibility does not require a showing of probability as a well-pleaded complaint can proceed even if “Iadc.tual proof of those facts is improbable, and that a recovery is very remote and unlikely.” at 556. However, legal conclusiAosnhsc raoreft nv.o Itq ebnatlitled to a presumptionN oafp torluetohn for the purposes of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. , 556 U.S. I6I6I.2 (20L0a9w); a nd Analy, s2i0s21 WL 5630895, at *4. A. Rule 12(b)( 1) To the extent Plaintiffs brings claims against Defendants in their official capacities for monetary damages, Defendants argue that this Court lacks jurisdiction over such claims under the doctrine of sovereign immunity. Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. Without jurisdiction cIonn rfee rFrEeMd Ab yT rsatailteurt eF oorrm thaeld Cehoyndseti tPurtoidosn. ,L diaisbt.r iLcitt icgo.urts lack the power to adjudicate claimSs.t o ckman v. FEC , 668 F.3d 281 , 28687 (5th Cir. 2012); , 138 F.3d 144 , 151 (5th Cir. 1998). Under Rule 12(b)(1), a claim is “properly dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdInic rtieo FnE wMhAe nT trhaeil ecrourt lacks the statutory or constitutional power to adjudicate” the claim. , 668 F.3d at 286-87 . As noted above, a court shouIldd. consider a Rule 12(b)(1) jurisdictional attack before addressing any attack on the merits. Considering a Rule 12(b)(1) motion to dismiss first “Idp.revents a court without jurisdiction from prematurely dismissing a case with prejudice.” Under the Eleventh Amendment of the United States Constitution, a non-consenting state is immune from any lawsuit seeking monetary damages or equiEtadbellme raenl ive.f J obrrdoaunght in federal courts by her own citizens or by the citizens of another state. , 415 U.S. 651, 662-63 (1974). Although Congress has the power to abrogate this immunity through the Fourteenth AmendmQeunetr, nit vh. aJso rndoatn done so as to claims for the deprivation of civil rights under Section 1983. , 440 U.S. 332, 345 (1979). And Louisiana has not consented to suits in federal court under Section 1983. La. Rev. Stat. § 13:5106(A). The Eleventh Amendment furtVhoerg tg. rva. nBtds. Oanf C“oamrmm 'orfs tohf eO srtleaaten”s sLoevveeree Digisnt .immunity from a suit against it in federal court. R egents of the Univ. of Cal v. Doe , 294 F.3d 684, 688-89 (5th Cir. 2002) (citing , 519 U.S. 425, 429 (1997)). When the state is the “real, substantial paSrptyik iens ivn. tMerceVseta,” the Eleventh Amendment also serves as a bar to suits against state officials. , Civ. A. No. 17-8164, 2018 see also Hughes v. Savell WL 3329060, Haat n*n5a ( Ev.. DLe. BLlaa. nJucly 6, 2018); , 902 F.2d 376 , 378 (5th Cir. 1990). In , the Fifth Circuit held that the Louisiana Department of Public Safety & Corrections (“DPSC”), as a Louisiana executive department and for whom all three Defendants work, is entitled to Eleventh Amendment protection. 716 F. App’x 265 , 269 (5th Cir. 1988). The DPSC is thus an “alter ego” of the State for purposes of the State’s Eleventh Amendment immunity, and Louisiana’s sovereign immunityO edxytennodcksi t vo. DLoPuSiCsi paenrasonnel such as Defendants when they are sued in their official capacity. Champagne v. Je,f fNeros. oCnV P 2a2r-. 2Sh0e9r, i2ff0's2 O2f WficLe 2132241, at *1-2 (E.D. La. June 14, 2022) (citing , 188 F.3d 312, 314 (5th Cir. 1999). The United States Supreme Court has specifically addressed the distinction between official capacity and individual capacity lawsuits and made clear that a suit against a state official in an official capacity for monetary damages is trHeaatfeerd va. Ms eal osuit against the state and is therefore barred by the Eleventh Amendment. , 502 U.S. 21, 25 (1991). Moreover, neither a State nor its officials acWtiinllg v .i nM itchhe. iDr eopf’tfi coifa Sl tacatep aPcoiltiicees are “persons” capable of being sued under Section 19F8a3i.r ley v. Stadler , 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989). As the Fifth Circuit stated in , “‘neither a State nor its officials acting in their official capacities are ‘persons’ under § 1983’ as § 1983 only provides a remedy against a ‘person,’ the dismissal of Fairley's § 1983 claims was indisputably proper.” 294 F. App'x 805, 808-09 (5th Ciidr.. 2008). Thus “long and clearly established Supreme Court precedent on this matter,” , means that all “official capacity” claims for monetary relief under Section 1983 lack an arguable legal basis and are thus subject to dismissal. For the reasons explained above and in accordance with longstanding precedent, federal courts lack jurisdiction over suits against state officials sued in their official capacities for monetary relief. Accordingly, this Court lacks jurisdiction over all claims for monetary relief against Defendants in their official capacities, and such claims are dismissed without — 3 — prejudiBce. . Rule 12(b)(6) While Plaintiff’s Complaint is less than clear as to the Constitutional grounds on which he bases his claims against Defendants in their individual capacities, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s claims sound in deliberate indifference to his medical needs and unconstitutional conditions of confinement based on the alleged unkempt showers and bathrooms. These alleged claims arise under the Eight Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. The Constitutional rights of an incarcerated person, regardless of whether he is a pretrial detainee or a convicted prisoner, are violated only if his seSrieoeu Ts hmomedpiscoanl nve. eUdpss haurer mCnetty .w, Titehx .deliberate indifference on the part Hofa rpreins avl. Hauegthmoarintnies. Hen, 2ry4 5v. FH.3igdg 4in4s7, 457 (5th Cir. 2001); , 198 F.3d 153, 159 (5th Cir. 1999); , No. Civ. A. 12-1886, 2013 WL 1694864 , at *2 (E.D. La. Apr. 18, 2013). “A serious medical need is one for which treatment has been recommended or for wGhoibcehr tth ve. nCaeelddw iesl lso apparent that even laymen would recognize that care is required.” , 463 F.3d 339 , 345 n.12 (5th Cir. 2006). In their motion to dismiss, Defendants 3 See Cox, Cox, Filo, Camel & Wilson, L.L.C. v. Sasol N. Am., Inc. When a district court dismisses a claim for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1), it must do so without prejudice. , 544 F. App'x 455, 456-57 (5th Cir. 2013) (finding dismissal with prejudice under Rule 12(b)(1) improper because this is “to disclaim jurisdiction and then exercise it”). argue that Plaintiff's needs were not met with “deliberate indifference.” For the following reasons, the Court finds that it is clear that Defendants are correct. As to the “deliberate indifference” requirement, the United States Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals has explained: Deliberate indifference is an extremely high standard to meet. It is indisputable that an incorrect diagnosis by prison medical personnel does not suffice to state a claim for deliberate indifference. Rather, the plaintiff must show that officials refused to treat him, ignored his complaints, intentionally treated him incorrectly, or engaged in any similar conduct that would clearly evince a wanton disregard for any serious medical needs. Furthermore, the decision whether to provide additional treatment is a classic example of a matter for medical judgment. And, the failure to alleviate a significant risk that the official should have perceived, but did not is insufficient to show deliberate Dominoi nvd. Tifefexr. eDnecpe'.t of Criminal Justice , 239 F.3d 752, 756 (5th Cir. 2001) (quotation marks, brackets, and citations omitted). “Deliberate indifference encompassMesc Coonrlmy iucnkn ve. Scetaslsdaerry and wanton infliction of pain repugnanset et oa tlshoe Sctoenwsaciret nvc. eM oufr mphaynkind.” , 105 F.3d 1059, 1061 (5th Cir. 1997); , 174 F.3d 530 , 534 (5th Cir. 1999). See Gobert An inmate is not guaranteed optimal medical care. , 463 F.3d at 349 (“[D]eliberate indifference exists wholly independent of an optimal standard of care.”). On the contrary, the Constitution does not eIvde.n require that an inmate's medical care be free from negligence or medical malpractice. at 346 (“Unsuccessful medical treatment, aHcatlsl ovf. nTehgolmigaesnce, or medical malpractice do not conssteiteu atels od eKleiblleyr va.t eG uinsmdiaffnerence. . . .”); , 190 F.3d 693, 697-98 (5th Cir. 1999); , Civ. A. No. 07-611, Cerna v. Tex. Tech Med. Staff 2007 WL 2007992 , at *4 (E.D. La. July 5, 2007); , No. 2:03-CV0322, 2004 WL 42602 , at *2 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 7, 2004). Simply put, absent exceptional circumstances, an inmaGtoeb'se rdtisagreement with his medical treatment does not constitute deliberate indifference. , 463 F.3d at 346 . For example, “the question of whether . . . additional . .E .s ftoelrlme vs. oGfa tmrebaletment [are] indicated is a classic example of a matter for medical judgment.” , 429 U.S. 97, 107 (1976). Generally, such matters of professional medical judgment are bHeetnterry left to the medical expertise of physicians rather than to the legal expertise of judges. , 2013 WL 1694864 , at *3-4. Federal courtWs aersetl athkeer evf. oLruec laosath to second-guess such medical decisions in federal civil rights actions. , 537 F.2d 857 , 860 n.5 (6th Cir. 1976) (“Where a prisoner has received some medical attention and the dispute is over the adequacy of the treatment, federal courts are generally reluctant to secondC agsutreos sv m. Leoduiicsaial njuadgments and to constitutionalize claims which sound in state tort law.”); , Civ. A. No. 084248, 2008 WL 5169401 , at *4 (E.D. La. Dec. 8, 2008) (“[M]edical judgments are not to be lightly second-guessed in a federal civil rights action.”). With regard to the alleged unconstitutional conditions of confinement, the Constitution does not require that prisons Sbeee cMomcApllliestteelry v s. aSntritaiizned or as clean or free from potential hazards as one's home might be. Tallmore v. Heber,t No. Civ. A. 09-2823, 2009 WL 5178316 , at *3 (E.D. La. Dec. s2e3e, a2ls0o0 9D)a; igre v. Maggio , No. 07-1220, 2008 WL 2597939 (W.D. La. May 28, 2008); , 719 F.2d 1310, 1312 (5th Cir. 1983) (finding that allegations that cell had blood on the walls, excretion and bread loafs on the floor did not constitute an extreme deprivation so as to violate his rights under Eighth Amendment; plaintiff “has not alleged the sort of ‘deprivation of facilities for elementary sanitation’ that [the Fifth Circuit] ha[s] observed gives rise to unconstitutional confinement.”). A minor sanitation restriction oWr phirtonbalcekm v, .a Dltohuogulgahs Candtmy.ittedly unpleasant, does not amounKtn toop a v c. Joonhsntsitountional violation. Robins,o 1n6 v .F I.l3l.d S t9a5t4e ,C 9o5rr8. (C8trth. Cir. 1994); , 977 F.2d 996 , 1013 (6th Cir. 1992); , 890 F. Supp. 715, 720 (N.D. Ill. 1995). InsteaBdu, r“tjoanil sv . Cmaumste ropnro Cvnidtye. only reasonably adequate hygiene and sanGirteaetnio vn. Fcoenrrdeiltlions.” , 884 F. Supp. 234, 241 (S.D. Tex. 1995) (citing , 801 F.2d 765 , 771 (5th Cir. 1986)). Serving timeH ionl lporwisaoyn v “. iGs unnonte all guarantee that one will be safe from life's occasional inconveniences.” , 685 F.2d 150, 156 (5th Cir. 1982). Federal courts have repeatedly held that the ConstitutTiaolnib d vo. eGsi lnleoyt mandate prisons with comfortable surroundings or commodious conditions. , 138 F.3d 211, 215 (5th Cir. 1998). Plaintiffs who sue government officials in their indSicvhiduultaela cva. pWaociotdies must allege specific conduct that gives rise to a constitutional violation. , 47 F.3d 1427, 1434 (5th Cir. 1995). Individual capacity claims “Jamcukssot nb ev .p Wleiaddmedal lwith ‘factual detail and particularity,’ noStc hmueltreea conclusory allegations.” , 99 F.3d 710 (5th Cir. 1996) (quoting , 47 F.3d at 14Id3.0). “Allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” OTvheoramllp, s“o[np ]ve. rSstoenealel involvement is an essential element of a civil rights cause of action.” , 709 F.2d 381, 382 (5th Cir. 1983). Plaintiff’s allegations fail to specify any personal involvement on the part of Defendants in any alleged deliberate indifference to his medical needs or his conditions of confinement. Defendant LeBlanc is the Secretary of the DPSC, Day is the Warden at RCC, and Brooks is the Assistant Warden at RCC. Defendants are thus supervisory officials of the DPSC andr eRsCpCo.n Ade sautp esurvpiesroiroyr official cannot be held liable pursuant to Section 1983 under a theory of merely Abletcoanu vs.e T eaxn. Ae&mMp lUoyneive. or subordinate allegedly violated PBlaasiknitnif vf'.s P caornksetritutional rights. , 168 F.3d 196, 200 (5th Cir. 1999); , 602 F.2d 1205, 1220 (5th Cir. 1979). To hold Defendants personally liable, Plaintiff must establish either that they were “personally involved in the acts causing the deprivation of his constitutional rights or that a causal connectionD eoxuitshtsit bve. tJwoneeesn an act of [these defendants] . . . and the alleged constitutional violations.” , 641 F.2d 345, 346 (5th Cir. 1981). Plaintiff does not allege that Defendants were present for, or personally involved in, his medical treatment or the cleaning of RCC. Plaintiff admits that LeBlanc and Day were not personally involved in his medical care or the cleaning of RCC. (Rec. doc. 1 at 11). And Plaintiff alleIdge. s only that Brooks “was personally involved in the act” and was “very unprofessional.” ( ). Such a conclusory statement is not pleading with particularity. Indeed, several times throughout his Complaint, Plaintiff directly blamesId t.he “medical staff” for his injuries and asks the Court to hold them liable, not Defendants. ( at 7, 11). These vague and conclusory allegations lack any factual detail or particularity and are thus insufficient to establish individual liability under Section 1983. Indeed, Plaintiff’s Complaint reveals nothing more than an inmate dissatisfied with the type and/or timing of the medical services provided to him and his frustration that the — 4 — treatment that he has received has not cured his eczema. As evidenced by Plaintiff’s ARPs and RCC’s response to same, it is clear that Plaintiff visited medical staff at RCC on numerous occasions aIdn.d was seen multiple times by an outside specialist for the treatment of his eczema. ( at 8). Furthermore, Plaintiff admits that he was “continuously seIndt. to the University Medical Center in New Orleans, LA to see a dermatologist.” ( at 7). Unfortunately, there was a delay in RCC’s ability to obtain the medication prescribed byId t.he dermatologist because it was not on the formulary for the Department of CorrectioInds.. ( at 8). However, the medication was eventually received and provided to Plaintiff. ( ). With regard to the conditions at RCC, Plaintiff’s ICdo.mplaint only describes the bathrooms and showers as “unkempt,” with no specificity. ( at 7). The Court finds that the allegations in Plaintiff’s Complaint simply do not rise to the level of deliberate indifference to his serious medicaCl .n eedsM oro tuinocno fnosrt iJtuudtigomnael ncto nodni ttihoen sP loef acdoinnfignsement. Plaintiff filed this motion before the Court in which he merely reiterates the allegations of his Complaint. (Rec. doc. 36 at 1-4). “After the pleadings are closed – but early enough not to delay trial – a party may move for judgment on the pleadings.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c). A motion for judgment on the pleadings is designed to dispose of cases where the material facts are not disputed, and a judgment on tGhree mate Prliatsi nosf Tthrue sctl aCiom. sv .c Mano rbgea rne Sntdaenrleedy bDye aenx aWmitinteartion of the substance of the pleadings. , 313 F.3d 305 , 313 n.8 (5th Cir. 2002). — 4 — Plaintiff was ultimately diagnosed with eczematous dermatitis by medical personnel at RCC. (Rec. doc. 1 at 8). “The central issue is whHetuhgehre, sin v .t hTeo bliagchcto m Inosstt. ,f Ianvco.rable to the Plaintiff, the complaint states a valid claim for relief.” , 278 F.3d 417 , 420 (5th Cir. 2001). The Court can dismiss a claim under Rule 12(c) when it is clear that Jtohnee Ps lva.i nGtriefnf icnagne rprove no set of facts in support of his claim tFheaet vw. Houelrdn deonntitle him to relief. , 188 F.3d 322, 324 (5th Cir. 1999) (citing , 900 F.2d 804, 807 (5th Cir. 1990)). In ruling on the motion, “the district courItd .is confined to the pleadings and must accept all allegations contained therein as true.” A court should not dismiss the claim unless the Plaintiff would not be entitled to relief under any set of facts Joorn aensy possible theory that he could prove consistent with the allegations in the complaint. , 188 F.3d at 324. As can be gleaned from the case law, a motion for judgment on the pleadings is a defense motion aimed at the dismissal of a plaintiff’s claims on the face of the pleadings. It seems clear that, had Plaintiff understood the nature of the motion, he would not have filed it as Plaintiff most likely would not voluntarily seek dismissal of his own claims. It appears that Plaintiff filed the motion in an attempt to argue that his claims should prevail on the pleadings given the strength of his case. That is not the purpose or the point of such a motion. The Court can only conclude that Plaintiff misunderstood the nature and purpose of the mIVo. tionC. oAncccloursdiionngly, it will dismiss the motion as improvidently filed. FITo rI Sth OeR foDrEeRgoEiDng reasons, that the Motion GtoR DAiNsmTEisDs (rec. doc. 27) filed by Defendants James LeBlanc, Travis Day, and Floyd Brooks is , and Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE in their official capacities are DISMISSED WIT Ha nPdR EPJlaUiDntIiCffE’s claims againstI DTe IfSe nFUdaRnTtsH iEnR t hOeRirD iEndRiEvDidual capacities are . that thDeI MSMotIiSoSnE fDor A JSu dIMgmPeRnOt VoInD tEhNe TPlLeYa dFiInLgEsD Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c) (rec. doc. 36) filed by Plaintif3f 1iss t October . New Orleans, Louisiana, this _______ day of _______________________, 2023. __________________________________________ MICHAEL B. NORTH UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE